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ARBITRATING ANTITRUST CLAIMS: FROM
SUSPICION TO TRUST
VERA KORZUN*
This Article examines the evolving role of international commercial ar-
bitration in the enforcement of domestic antitrust laws.  It first explores how
antitrust claims and issues arise in international arbitrations.  It then de-
scribes three phases in the evolution of domestic courts’ attitude toward the
adjudication of antitrust claims by international arbitral tribunals.  Ini-
tially, national courts—like courts of the United States prior to the U.S.
Supreme Court’s pathmarking 1985 decision in Mitsubishi v. Soler—were
suspicious of private adjudication of antitrust claims, cognizant of the pub-
lic values implicated by antitrust law.  A remarkable but unnoticed transfor-
mation has since ensued.  Now, the national courts of most developed econo-
mies accept (and even mandate) adjudication of antitrust claims by private
international arbitral tribunals.  This transformation may be predictive of
future acceptance of international arbitral tribunals as trustworthy forums
for dispute resolution of other “public” subject matters.  This Article con-
cludes by suggesting how international arbitrators should discharge their
new role and how domestic courts might police it.
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I. INTRODUCTION
International arbitration of antitrust claims is an impor-
tant yet under-examined subject.  Even today, thirty years after
the U.S. Supreme Court established the arbitrability of U.S.
federal antitrust claims in a foreign arbitral proceeding in Mit-
subishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,1 the possibil-
ity of arbitrating antitrust issues in international arbitration re-
mains largely overlooked by both antitrust and arbitration law-
yers.  Seasoned practitioners of international arbitration are
aware of the possibility and even occasionally witness antitrust
claims raised in arbitral proceedings.  The common percep-
tion, however, is that antitrust laws raise an array of complex
issues ill-suited for international arbitration.  In fact, antitrust
claims have often been opposed in international arbitrations
on “technical” grounds—arbitrability, mandatory law, public
policy—rather than on the merits of the arbitration claims
themselves.
Opponents of private arbitration of antitrust claims dur-
ing the decades prior to Mitsubishi usually invoked the non-
arbitrability argument.2  After the Mitsubishi decision dis-
1. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614 (1985).
2. See American Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821,
827–28 (2d. Cir. 1968) (“[P]ervasive public interest in enforcement of the
antitrust laws, and the nature of the claims that arise in such cases . . .
[make] the antitrust claims raised here . . . inappropriate for arbitration.”);
Aimcee Wholesale Corp. v. Tomar Prods., Inc., 237 N.E.2d 223, 225 (N.Y.
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patched the arbitrability objection, arguments based on
mandatory law—claiming that a particular outcome would run
afoul of the antitrust laws of a key jurisdiction—and attacks on
rendered arbitral awards on the ground of public policy be-
came the favored weapons of parties seeking to use antitrust
law to avoid adverse international arbitral awards.3
The tension between antitrust laws and international arbi-
tration derives from their fundamental opposition along the
public-private dichotomy.4  Antitrust laws seek to protect pub-
lic interests by preserving free competition in the markets.
Public antitrust or competition agencies commonly enforce
these laws by imposing fines, injunctions, or even criminal
penalties pursuant to domestic antitrust laws.  In some jurisdic-
tions—the United States being a notable example—antitrust
laws permit private parties, including consumers, to sue for al-
leged unlawful anti-competitive conduct and to seek treble
damages as a stand-in for the public harm caused by antitrust
violations.
By contrast, international arbitration is a form of private
ordering aimed at dispute resolution.  It is a creature of con-
1968) (“[T]he enforcement of our State’s antitrust policy should not be left
within the purview of commercial arbitration.”); Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp.,
410 F.Supp. 10, 25 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (“It is now cardinal doctrine that the
public interest in the enforcement of the antiturst [sic] laws makes antitrust
claims inappropriate subjects for arbitration.” (footnote omitted)); Capital
City Pub. Co. v. Trenton Times Corp., 575 F.Supp. 1339, 1350 (D.C.N.J.,
1983) (“[I]t is clear that at least a portion of plaintiff’s claims could not be
subject to an agreement to arbitrate any way, under the principle that anti-
trust claims may not be the subject of arbitration.” (citation omitted)).
3. See, e.g., Baxter Intern., Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, 315 F.3d 829 (7th
Cir. 2003) (where the award-loser in arbitration sought to challenge the
award in court alleging that the license agreement at issue, as interpreted by
the tribunal, would violate the U.S. antitrust law and as such is against the
public policy).
4. See, e.g., Sotiris I. Dempegiotis, EC Competition Law and International
Commercial Arbitration: A New Era in the Interplay of These Legal Orders and a New
Challenge for the European Commission, 1 GLOBAL ANTITRUST REV. 135, 135
(2008) (noting “the conceptual conflict that . . . arises out of the ‘confronta-
tion’ between EC competition law and the international commercial arbitra-
tion realm, namely between a set of rules of a prevalent public law nature
enjoying a supranational constitutional status through inclusion in the EC
Treaty and serving as transnational mandatory norms on the one hand, and
a private, confidential, flexible, and independent adjudication mechanism
for the resolution and final settlement of international commercial (and
mostly contractual) disputes on the other” (citation omitted)).
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tract.  As such, it may serve as an alternative to litigation in
public courts.  The supervisory power of courts is limited by
the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and En-
forcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958 (the New York
Convention),5 a multilateral treaty committing its 156 states
signatories to honor international arbitration agreements and
arbitral awards subject to a limited number of exceptions.  The
most important exception with respect to antitrust law is that
arbitral awards may be set aside at the place of arbitration or
refused enforcement if they are contrary to the public policy
of the state involved.6  However, national courts tend to be ex-
ceedingly deferential when reviewing international arbitral
awards, except where domestic implementation of the New
York Convention makes available specific grounds for chal-
lenging their recognition or enforcement.
The public function of antitrust law and the private order-
ing of international arbitration collide when a party in an arbi-
tral proceeding invokes antitrust claims in addition to stan-
dard breach of contract claims.  In such a case, the state is
neither enforcing its antitrust laws nor delegating enforce-
ment authority to a private party, because international arbi-
trations often take place outside of the state’s jurisdiction.
Furthermore, parties to an international arbitration proceed-
ing may choose to have a third country’s law applied to the
substance of their dispute, which could displace the antitrust
law of a state that views its law as mandatory based on the ex-
tent of the dispute’s connection with its jurisdiction.7
From a state’s perspective, the tension posed by the sur-
render of control over antitrust enforcement to international
5. See United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New
York Convention].
6. Id. art. V(2)(b).  See also G.A. Res 40/72, United Nations Commission
on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on International
Commercial Arbitration, U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/72 (Dec. 11, 1985) amended
by G.A. Res 61/33, U.N Doc. A/RES/61/33 (Dec. 18, 2006), art. 34(2)(b)(ii)
[hereinafter UNCITRAL Model Law].
7. Consider the facts of Mitsubishi where the sales agreement between a
Puerto Rican automobile dealer and a Japanese car manufacturer and a
Swiss automobile distributor subject to Swiss law provided for arbitration in
Japan.  The U.S. antitrust law could therefore be displaced in arbitration all
together. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473
U.S 614, 614 (1985).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYI\48-3\NYI303.txt unknown Seq: 5  4-MAY-16 8:38
2016] ARBITRATING ANTITRUST CLAIMS 871
arbitrators is tempered by the prospect of back-end judicial re-
view over arbitral awards.  This back-end judicial review can be
achieved by the setting aside or enforcement proceedings,
most commonly on public policy grounds.8  National courts,
however, have struggled over the years to establish a proper
standard of review for antitrust-related awards.  On the one
hand, under the pro-arbitration shadow of the New York Con-
vention, they have expressed a strong desire to defer to deter-
minations made by international arbitral tribunals.9  On the
other hand, national courts, starting with the U.S. Supreme
Court in Mitsubishi, have acknowledged the need for a search-
ing review of the antitrust implications of arbitral awards,
given the involved public interests.10
Despite the theoretical appeal of allowing judicial review
of antitrust issues, using the New York Convention’s “public
policy” ground for such review is problematic.  Given the plas-
ticity of public policy, national courts have been reluctant to
invoke it too frequently as a ground for nullifying an arbitral
award or denying its enforcement.11  The challenge, then, is to
find a way of ensuring that all applicable antitrust laws are con-
sidered and applied faithfully in arbitral proceedings without
8. See id. at 638 (where the U.S. Supreme Court laid the grounds for
what has become known as the “second look” doctrine by holding that
“[h]aving permitted the arbitration to go forward, the national courts of the
United States will have the opportunity at the award-enforcement stage to
ensure that the legitimate interest in the enforcement of the antitrust laws
has been addressed”).
9. See, e.g., Baxter Intern., Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, 315 F.3d 829, 832
(7th Cir. 2003) (“Mitsubishi did not contemplate that, once arbitration was
over, the federal courts would throw the result in the waste basket and liti-
gate the antitrust issues anew.  That would just be another way of saying that
antitrust matters are not arbitrable. . . . The arbitration tribunal in this case
‘took cognizance of the antitrust claims and actually decided them.’  Ensur-
ing this is as far as our review legitimately goes.”).
10. See Hof’s-Gravenhage 24 maart 2005, NJF 2005, 239 (Marketing Dis-
plays International Inc. (MDI)/VR) (Neth.), translated in 31 Y.B. COMM.
ARB’N 808 (2006) (where the Court of Appeal of The Hague in the enforce-
ment proceeding conducted a review on the merits of foreign arbitral
awards to ensure correct application of EC competition law).
11. For instance, the U.K. courts are believed to have refused enforce-
ment of an award on the public policy grounds only in a single case. See
NIGEL BLACKABY ET AL., REDFERN AND HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRA-
TION ¶ 11.104 (5th ed. 2009).
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relying too heavily on intrusive judicial review of arbitral
awards under the troublesome rubric of “public policy.”
The key, in my view, is to invoke the voluntary assistance
of international arbitrators.  If emphasis is put on the applica-
tion of antitrust law in international arbitrations on the front
end—engendering a norm of arbitrator-as-antitrust regulator,
so to speak—resultant awards more likely will survive a defer-
ential abuse-of-discretion type judicial review in back-end set-
ting aside and enforcement proceedings.
Judicial perceptions of the suitability of arbitral tribunals
for performing antitrust enforcement functions have already
changed since Mitsubishi.  Today, arbitral tribunals are not
only perceived by the parties as a trustworthy forum for the
resolution of private antitrust disputes, but courts have also be-
come comfortable with entrusting arbitral tribunals with apply-
ing antitrust laws.12
The question is how to provide incentives for arbitrators
to apply antitrust law at the front end, and to do so sua sponte
where parties fail to raise antitrust concerns themselves.  The
answer may lie in the arbitrator’s obligation to produce an en-
forceable award.  This obligation provides a compelling incen-
tive for the arbitrator to consider and apply antitrust law, be-
cause failure to do so may lead to setting aside or non-enforce-
ment of resultant arbitral awards.  This Article argues that the
arbitrator’s obligation with respect to antitrust law may be en-
forced through reputational remedies, which are especially ef-
fective in international arbitration as most international arbi-
trators are repeat players in the field.
This Article has two major aims.  First, it will survey the
history of antitrust claims in international arbitrations over the
past thirty years.  Prior studies of the history of antitrust claims
in international arbitrations tend to focus on the 1985 U.S.
Supreme Court decision in Mitsubishi and subsequent U.S. and
European judicial decisions reaffirming the same basic princi-
12. See, e.g., Baxter, 315 F.3d at 829 (affirming the lower court decision to
confirm an international arbitral award that addressed antitrust claims, with-
out allowing the plaintiff to reargue in front of the court antitrust claims
already decided by the arbitral tribunal); Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court
of appeal] Paris, 1e ch. (section C), Nov. 18, 2004, 2004 REVUE DE
L’ARBITRAGE [REV. ARB] 986 (Fr.) (suggesting there exists an ex officio duty of
an arbitrator to apply EU competition law).
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ple that antitrust claims are arbitrable.13  A second, less stud-
ied phase in the history of antitrust arbitration involves cases
of judicial review of antitrust-related arbitral awards in setting
aside and recognition and enforcement proceedings in na-
tional courts.  Once Mitsubishi and similar decisions estab-
lished the threshold principle of arbitrability, antitrust arbitra-
tions were allowed to go forward, and judicial scrutiny turned
to evaluation of resultant arbitral awards—what the U.S. Su-
preme Court in Mitsubishi referred to as the “second look.”
The standard of review became an important issue in these
second-generation cases.14
There appears, now, to be a third phase in the develop-
ment of antitrust arbitration (see Table 1).  Having accepted
the notion that private arbitral tribunals are capable of adjudi-
cating antitrust claims, national courts are increasingly demon-
strating an expectation that arbitral tribunals are an appropri-
ate and desired forum for enforcing arbitration laws.  And so,
courts are comfortable with ratifying arbitral awards pursuant
to light-touch judicial review as long as antitrust law has been
considered in arbitration.  Even when the parties do not raise
antitrust issues in arbitration proceedings, courts have sug-
gested that arbitrators have an obligation to screen any award
for antitrust law implications, just like a state regulator might
do with respect to a proposed merger of companies.15
The second aim of this Article is to suggest how arbitral
tribunals should honor their traditional dispute resolution
13. See, e.g., Donald F. Donovan & Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, Mitsubishi
After Twenty Years: Mandatory Rules before Courts and International Arbitrators, in
PERVASIVE PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 11 (Loukas A. Mistelis &
Julian D.M. Lew eds., 2006) (analyzing the Mitsubishi decision and its impli-
cations for the debate as to how domestic courts and arbitrators should treat
mandatory law rules); Thomas J. Brewer, The Arbitrability of Antitrust Disputes:
Freedom to Contract for an Alternative Forum, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 91 (1997) (ex-
amining the decision in Mitsubishi and more recent case law and their impli-
cations for the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate antitrust disputes);
Ludwig Von Zumbusch, Arbitrability of Antitrust Claims Under U.S., German,
and EEC Law: The ‘International Transaction’ Criterion and Public Policy, 22 TEX.
INT’L L.J. 291 (1987) (analyzing the Mitsubishi decision and comparing its
approach to German and EEC law addressing arbitrability of antitrust
claims).
14. See discussion infra Part III.B.
15. See Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, 1e ch. (sec-
tion C), Nov. 18, 2004, 2004 REVUE DE L’ARBITRAGE [REV. ARB.] 986 (Fr.).
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mandate as creatures of contract written by private parties
while also managing this newfound public duty as antitrust
regulators.  This puzzle raises difficult questions of mandatory
law and the function of international commercial arbitration.
A satisfactory resolution of the puzzle may also prove illumi-
nating to current debates about the legitimacy of using private
investor-state arbitral tribunals to resolve public regulatory
matters under the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) agree-
ments.
TABLE 1: THREE PHASES OF ANTITRUST ARBITRATION
DEVELOPMENT
Prior to or at the During During settingPhase/Its place
beginning of arbitration aside orin the arbitration
arbitration enforcementprocess
proceedings
Phase 1 Establishing the
arbitrability of
antitrust law
issues
Phase 2 Establishing a
proper standard
of court review of
arbitral awards
Phase 3 Developing trust
in the arbitrators’
ability to apply
antitrust law
This Article has three Parts.  Following this introduction,
Part II provides an overview of international arbitration of an-
titrust claims.  It begins by explaining how various antitrust
claims and issues may arise in international arbitrations.  It
continues by discussing a special case of commitment arbitra-
tions—arbitrations that may derive from legal commitments
undertaken by parties, most commonly, as as a condition of
merger clearance.16  In doing so, it explains how antitrust law
may be invoked in international arbitration through the con-
cepts of mandatory law and public policy.  Part III examines
16. For further details on commitment arbitrations, see infra Part II.A(2).
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the law and practice of international arbitral tribunals and na-
tional courts in arbitrating antitrust claims over time.  It asserts
that we are witnessing a new phase in the development of anti-
trust arbitration where arbitral tribunals are increasingly relied
upon by the state in the enforcement of antitrust laws beyond
the parties’ intent.  Part IV then seeks to address the resultant
arbitrators’ obligation to raise and apply antitrust law in inter-
national arbitration.  It concludes by offering observations and
normative suggestions with a view to balancing the private in-
terests of disputing parties in arbitrating antitrust claims with
the public policy concerns of enforcing antitrust law.  A short
conclusion follows.
II. ANTITRUST IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: AN OVERVIEW
This Part explains how and when antitrust claims or issues
may arise in international arbitration and the court proceed-
ings resulting from such arbitration.  The focus of my analysis
is on international arbitration, which generates more compli-
cated issues regarding the application of antitrust law than
would normally arise in domestic arbitration for at least three
reasons.  First, international arbitration may require the arbi-
tral tribunal to consider the antitrust laws of several jurisdic-
tions.17  Second, such antitrust laws may be at odds with each
other, compelling the tribunal to make a choice-of-law deter-
mination as to which of one-or-more conflicting antitrust laws
should be applied in a given dispute.  Third, at the post-award
stage in setting aside or enforcement proceedings, interna-
17. The multiplicity of various national antitrust laws to be considered in
antitrust arbitration is the reflection of the international commercial arbitra-
tion itself, which commonly calls for application of several different systems
of law. See BLACKABY ET AL., supra note 11, ¶ 3.07 (counting “at least five R
different systems of law which in practice may have a bearing on an interna-
tional commercial arbitration”).  Although antitrust issues and concerns may
come up in an international commercial arbitration through a variety of
concepts, such as the arbitrability, mandatory law, public policy, or the sub-
stantive law, any of the systems of law to be applied in international commer-
cial arbitration may include antitrust law provisions.  Consequently, in a typi-
cal international commercial arbitration one system of antitrust law may
have to be considered as part of the law governing the arbitration agree-
ment, another—through the law of the seat (lex arbitri), third—as part of the
governing law to be applied to the substance of the parties’ dispute, and at
least one more—through the law of the country(ies) governing the recogni-
tion or enforcement of the arbitral award.
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tional arbitration may yet again require courts to consider the
antitrust laws and public policy of several jurisdictions—most
prominently, of the place of arbitration or place of enforce-
ment.
International arbitration has long been recognized as an
important and often preferred mechanism of resolving inter-
national commercial disputes.18  Parties to international busi-
ness transactions often choose international commercial arbi-
tration over litigation in a foreign jurisdiction because of the
neutrality of the forum; the finality and enforceability of arbi-
tral awards under the New York Convention;19 and the privacy,
confidentiality, and flexibility of the arbitral process.20  Fur-
ther, in contrast to litigation, where parties have little or no
control in selecting the judge to resolve their dispute, parties
to an international arbitration may choose members of the ar-
bitral tribunal, tailoring arbitrators’ qualifications and experi-
ence to the needs of a particular dispute.21
18. See 1 GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 68
(2009) (“[A]rbitration has for centuries been perceived as the most effec-
tive—if by no means flawless—means for resolving international commercial
disputes.” (footnote omitted)); id. at 70 (“The same increasing preference
for, and use of, international commercial arbitration is reflected in surveys
of users and in empirical studies of the use of arbitration clauses in interna-
tional commercial agreements” (footnotes omitted)).
19. See New York Convention, supra note 5. R
20. See White & Case, 2015 International Arbitration Survey: Improve-
ments and Innovations in International Arbitration 6 (2015), http://
www.whitecase.com/sites/whitecase/files/files/download/publications/
qmul-international-arbitration-survey-2015_0.pdf (listing the enforceability
of awards, ability to avoid specific legal systems or national courts, flexibility,
ability to select arbitrators, neutrality and finality as the most valuable char-
acteristics of international arbitration that motivate its users to choose arbi-
tration as a dispute resolution method). See generally BLACKABY ET AL., supra
note 11, ¶¶ 1.86–1.98 (discussing advantages of international arbitration by R
explaining why parties to an international dispute should arbitrate rather
than litigate in national courts).  For a discussion of the advantages of arbi-
tration for resolving antitrust disputes, see Alexis Mourre & Luca G. Radicati
Di Brozolo, Towards Finality of Arbitral Awards: Two Steps Forward and One Step
Back, 23 J. INT’L ARB. 171, 171 (2006). See also Donald I. Baker & Mark R.
Stabile, Arbitration of Antitrust Claims: Opportunities and Hazards for Corporate
Counsel, 48 BUS. LAW. 395, 395 (1993).
21. See White & Case, 2015 International Arbitration Survey, supra note
20, at 6 (naming “selection of arbitrators” as the fourth most valuable char- R
acteristic of international arbitration, according to the survey’s respon-
dents).  In antitrust arbitrations, parties may select arbitrators with prior ex-
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Its recognized advantages aside, there remain constraints
on international arbitration’s capacity to adjudicate antitrust
claims.  First, despite Mitsubishi and its progeny, the arbi-
trability of antitrust issues may be limited by the arbitration
laws of jurisdictions connected to the underlying dispute.22
Second, a dispute may have contractual limitations preventing
its resolution by international arbitration.  For instance, inter-
national arbitration might not be available in the absence of
an arbitration agreement between disputing parties, or where
the scope of the agreement is too narrow to encompass anti-
trust claims.23  Third, the antitrust law at issue might not af-
ford private remedies that can be invoked in international ar-
bitration.  Instead, as it is commonly the case with EU competi-
tion law, the alleged antitrust violation may require public
antitrust enforcement initiated by filing a complaint with anti-
trust authorities.24  Finally, antitrust law may be viewed as
perience in antitrust or background in economics to better address complex
antitrust analysis often required for resolution of antitrust disputes. See
Attheraces Ltd. v. The British Horseracing Board Ltd. [2007] EWCA Civ 38,
[para. 7] (noting, in the opinion by Lord Justice Mummery, that arbitral
tribunals might be better positioned than courts to address antitrust disputes
because “[t]he nature of these difficult [pricing and access] questions [in
relation to essential facilities] suggests that the problems of gaining access to
essential facilities and of legal curbs on excessive and discriminatory pricing
might be solved more satisfactorily by arbitration or by a specialist body
equipped with appropriate expertise and flexible powers”).
22. Antitrust issues appear to be non-arbitrable under Russian law. See,
e.g., 
 1–74 (2013).  It is
also uncertain whether antitrust issues can be arbitrated under the laws of
the UAE. See Gordon Blanke, The New UAE Competition Law: Is It Arbitrable or
Is It not Arbitrable? – That is the Question . . ., KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Feb. 19,
2013), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2013/02/19/the-new-uae-
competition-law-is-it-arbitrable-or-is-it-not-arbitrable-that-is-the-question/.
23. See, e.g., AASI Creditor Liquidating Trust v. AU Optronics Corp. (In
re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig.), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102307 65
(finding the arbitration clause providing for arbitration of disputes “between
the parties regarding the terms of this Agreement” to be too narrow to en-
compass antitrust claims); Zoran Corp v. DTS, Inc., 2009 WL 160238 (N.D.
Cal. 2009) (distinguishing between antitrust claims falling within the scope
of the arbitration and those remaining outside of it because of the narrow
subject-matter of the arbitration clause at issue).
24. It should be noted that EU competition law still relies predominantly
on public enforcement by the European Commission and national antitrust
authorities of the EU Member States. See PHILLIP LANDOLT, MODERNISED EC
COMPETITION LAW IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 2 (2006) (observing that
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mandatory and therefore may have to be taken into account
despite the choice of law made by the parties (e.g., mandatory
law of the seat of arbitration) and/or in addition to such laws
(e.g., mandatory law and public policy of the place of enforce-
ment).
A. Antitrust Claims in International Arbitration
In international arbitration, antitrust claims or issues may
arise in any of the three stages of the arbitration process: (1)
prior to arbitration (most commonly, as part of the arbi-
trability discussion in court proceedings seeking to enforce the
arbitration agreement); (2) during the arbitration (as part of
governing law or mandatory law at issue); and (3) following
the arbitration (in setting aside or enforcement proceedings,
usually, as part of a public policy argument).
In the past, antitrust arguments were rarely raised in arbi-
tral proceedings, although the private and confidential nature
of international arbitration makes it impossible to ascertain
the exact number of arbitrations where antitrust issues were
invoked.  One pioneering empirical study of antitrust claims in
international arbitrations examined the application of EU
“the primary basis for the enforcement of EC competition law is the action
of public agencies”).  Private suits for compensatory damages are possible in
national courts of the Member States, but rarely used in practice.  See Wouter
P.J. Wils, Should Private Enforcement be Encouraged in Europe? 26 WORLD COMPE-
TITION 473, 473 (2003) (noting that “[i]n private litigation  . . . rarely are the
EC antitrust rules used proactively (as a “sword”) to claim damages or in-
junctive relief in national courts”).  However, private enforcement of EU
competition law is expected to grow as the European Commission has been
promoting it among Member States at least since 2003, when it began mod-
ernization of the EU competition law system following the introduction of
Council Regulation 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the Implementation of
the Rules on Competition Laid Down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty,
Council Regulation 1/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 1) 1 (EC) [hereinafter Regulation
1/2003].  It has been suggested that much of private enforcement can be
done through arbitration. See, e.g., Laurence Idot, Arbitration and the Reform
of Regulation 17/62, EUR. COMP. L. ANN. 307, 311 (2001) (arguing that “the
contractual disputes that are affected the most by the reform [of the EU
competition law system] have as good a chance of being settled by an arbitra-
tor as by a national judge”). See also Dempegiotis, supra note 4, at 136 (“the R
enhanced role of private enforcement along with the corresponding grow-
ing importance of private adjudication in Europe generally constitute a
quite clear indication of the significant anticipated expansion of the use of
arbitration in the application of EC competition law”).
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competition law in International Chamber of Commerce
(ICC) arbitrations between July 1988 and January 1994.25  Out
of 700 arbitral awards rendered in that period, Verbist located
only seventeen awards that involved questions of European
competition law, including two awards dealing with the issue
of arbitrability.26
In 2003, Dolmans and Grierson undertook a study of arbi-
trations involving EU competition law (mostly from the ICC,
apart from one case from the Swiss Court of Arbitration for
Sport) and concluded that “[s]omewhat surprisingly, competi-
tion arguments appear to have been rare in published compe-
tition cases.”27  Out of twenty-eight published cases discussing
EU competition law, the authors identified only three in which
arbitral tribunals accepted antitrust law claims after proper
consideration.  All three of these instances dealt with non-com-
pete clauses, which were invalidated or narrowed by the arbi-
tral tribunal.  One case also involved a ban on passive sales.28
In two additional cases, arbitrators raised EU competition law
arguments on their own.29  At the time, a substantial workload
of antitrust cases was believed to be conducted through ad hoc
arbitrations.30
In the past decade, antitrust claims and issues have been
invoked more often in international arbitrations.  A recent
study reports at least fifty-five ICC awards (published or pub-
licly commented on) for the period of 1964-2010, with nearly
one third of them rendered since 2000.31  Forty-four of these
awards dealt with issues of EU competition law (including Arti-
25. See Herman Verbist, The Application of European Community Law in ICC
Arbitrations – Presentation of Arbitral Awards, ICC INT’L CT. OF ARB. BULL.,
SPEC. SUPP., INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN EUROPE 33 (1994).
26. Id. at 33.
27. Maurits Dolmans & Jacob Grierson, Arbitration and the Modernization of
EC Antitrust Law: New Opportunities and New Responsibilities, 14 ICC INT’L CT.
OF ARB. BULL. 37, 37 (2003).  The study did not include unpublished awards,
awards were arbitrators ignored antitrust issues, awards under arbitration
rules other than those of the ICC, and settled cases. Id. at 38.
28. Id. at 37 n.7.
29. Id. at 38 n.8.
30. Id. at 37 n.4 (referring to findings reflected in M. Blessing, EG/US
Kartellrecht in Internationalen Schiedsverfahren – 77 Aktuelle Fragen aus der Praxis
(Basel: Helbing & Lichtenhahn, 2002)).
31. For more detailed information on these awards, see Annex III: Table
on ICC Arbitration Awards Involving Antitrust Issues over the Period 1964–2010, in
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cles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Euro-
pean Union32 (TFEU) and state aid provisions); nine awards
involved national antitrust laws of the Czech Republic, France,
Germany, Hungary, Italy, South Korea, Portugal, and Spain;
and two awards implicated U.S. antitrust laws.33
Following the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Mitsub-
ishi,34 and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) decision in Eco
Swiss,35 it appears that the arbitrability of U.S. and EU compe-
tition laws is, to use the words of Yves Derains, “no longer seri-
ously challenged.”36  Instead, antitrust claims are commonly
used today in international arbitration as a “shield” (as in Mit-
subishi itself), that is, raised as a defense to breach of contract
or other claims.37  In a typical “shield” case, a party seeks to
excuse non-performance under a contract by alleging invalid-
ity of the contract due to its inconsistency with applicable anti-
2 EU AND US ANTITRUST ARBITRATION. A HANDBOOK FOR PRACTITIONERS
2063–92 (Gordon Blanke & Phillip Landolt eds., 2011).
32. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Eu-
ropean Union arts. 101 and 102, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 1 [herein-
after TFEU].
33. See Annex III: Table on ICC Arbitration Awards Involving Antitrust Issues
over the Period 1964–2010, supra note 31, at 2063–92. R
34. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614 (1985).
35. Case C-126/97, Eco Swiss China Time Ltd v. Benetton Int’l, 1999
E.C.R. I-3055.
36. Yves Derains, Specific Issues Arising in the Enforcement of EC Antitrust
Rules by Arbitration Courts, 2001 EUR. COMPETITION. L. ANN. 323, 323 (2001)
(making an observation with respect to EC antitrust law, but the same is
applicable to U.S. antitrust law because of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision
in Mitsubishi establishing the arbitrability of federal antitrust law in the
United States). See also Luca G. Radicati Di Brozolo, Antitrust: A Paradigm of
the Relations Between Mandatory Rules and Arbitration – A Fresh Look at the “Sec-
ond Look”, 7 INT’L ARB. L. REV. 23, 23 (2004) [hereinafter Radicati Di
Brozolo, Antitrust] (explaining such consensus on the arbitrability “to a large
extent on the premise that arbitrators will apply the competition law of the
country whose courts decline jurisdiction in favour of arbitration, and on the
further premise that in any case, those courts retain the possibility to case a
‘second look’ on the solution reached by the arbitrators”).
37. See Wils, supra note 24, at 473 (“In private litigation, Articles 81 and R
82 EC are regularly invoked as a defence (or ‘shield’), mainly in contractual
disputes . . . .”); id. at 474 (explaining that “antitrust prohibitions are used as
a shield when they are invoked in defence against a contractual claim for
performance or for damages because of non-performance or against some
other claim, for instance in an intellectual property infringement action”
(emphasis added)).
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trust law.38  Arbitral tribunals may then rule on the validity of
the contract or, having established its existence and validity,
award damages for non-performance or unsatisfactory per-
formance of contractual obligations.39
Antitrust laws may also be raised in international arbitra-
tion as a “sword.”40  In these cases, the party brings its claim in
international arbitration seeking an injunction of anti-compet-
itive actions or damages resulting from the alleged violation of
antitrust law by its contractual counter party.41  In both scena-
rios, arbitral tribunals settle civil disputes resulting from the
application of antitrust law, and therefore do not interfere
with but supplement the enforcement functions of public anti-
trust authorities.
Once an arbitral award is granted—regardless of whether
antitrust claims were originally raised in arbitration—antitrust
law may be invoked in suits to set aside, recognize, or enforce
the award.  Typically, such back-end suits involve allegations of
a violation of public policy within the meaning of the New
York Convention.42  Such challenges raise the issues of the ap-
plication of mandatory law in international arbitration, as well
as the scope of the Convention’s public policy exception (dis-
cussed more thoroughly in Part II.B below).
38. Id. at 474.
39. Int’l Chamber of Commerce. Joint Working Party on Arbitration and
Competition, Arbitration and Competition, 21 SWISS REV. INT’L ANTITRUST L.
37, 38 (1984) (“But arbitrators can settle civil disputes which result from the
application of the competition rules, in other words they can make a ruling
on the validity or nullity of a contractual clause or of a contract and on the
possible allocation of damages in the case of non-performance or defective
performance of an obligation recognized as valid”).
40. See Wils, supra note 24, at 474 (explaining that “[t]he antitrust rules R
are used as a sword if they are used proactively by private parties as a basis for
claiming damages or injunctive relief”).
41. Id.
42. For examples of cases involving allegations of the public policy viola-
tion due to the non-application or improper application of antitrust law in
arbitration, see Case C-126/97, Eco Swiss China Time Ltd v. Benetton Int’l,
1999 E.C.R. I-3055; Baxter Intern., Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, 315 F.3d 829
(7th Cir. 2003); MDI v. Van Raalte (decision of 24 March 2005), supra note
10; Request for a preliminary ruling from the Cour d’appel de Paris R
(France), lodged on 9 December 2014, Genentech Inc. v Hoechst GmbH,
formerly Hoechst AG, Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GmbH (Case C-567/14),
2015 O.J. (C73) 12.
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1. Antitrust Disputes and Their Suitability for Arbitration
Most antitrust disputes derive from two bigger groups of
antitrust violations—anticompetitive contracts and monopoli-
zation.  Even within these two categories, antitrust disputes are
extremely diverse as to their facts, parties, and the nature and
complexity of the relationships among parties.  Such disputes
therefore vary widely in terms of suitability for arbitration,
which might be further limited by the scope of the arbitration
agreement at issue.43
Antitrust disputes can arise in contractual and non-con-
tractual (tort) contexts.44  Contractual claims arise out of, or
in connection with, business agreements between disputing
parties.  Common examples include antitrust disputes related
to the provisions of vertical agreements such as distribution,
supply, licensing, and franchise contracts.  There may also be
disputes arising out of horizontal agreements between compet-
itors (e.g., joint research and development (R&D) agree-
ments).  Because international arbitration is itself a creature of
contract, antitrust issues that arise in international arbitral pro-
ceedings are most commonly of a contractual nature.45  More
rarely, a party alleging antitrust injury may bring non-contrac-
tual claims in international arbitration, for instance by assert-
ing damages caused by monopolization (or abuse of domi-
nance) or anticompetitive agreements with third parties, in-
cluding division of markets or consumers, and price-fixing.46
43. See Michael Bowsher, Arbitration and Competition, in COMPETITION LITI-
GATION IN THE UK 398, 415 (2005) (“[i]t does not of course follow that all
issues will fall naturally within the scope of an arbitration . . . . In particular,
some Art. 82 issues are unlikely to arise in arbitration unless the parties en-
tered into an ad hoc agreement particularly in connection with this dis-
pute”).
44. See Idot, supra note 24, at 309–11 (discussing different roles of arbi- R
tration for resolution of contractual disputes, such as disputes between par-
ties to distribution or licensing agreements regarding their contractual pro-
visions which might raise competition concerns, as opposed to non-contrac-
tual disputes, such as—most commonly—actions for damages resulting from
abuse of a dominant position).
45. Id. at 309 (“In non-contractual disputes, arbitration is secondary . . .
whereas it is pre-eminent in contractual disputes”).
46. Id. at 310 (“the rare [non-contractual] actions [for damages] that are
brought usually result from abuse of dominant position. . . .”).
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Baker and Stabile have suggested a helpful classification
system.47  Depending on the nature of the claim and the rela-
tionship of the parties, they distinguish four categories of anti-
trust disputes with varying suitability for arbitration: (1) part-
nership disputes, (2) bilateral buyer/seller disputes, (3) dis-
putes over conspiracies with strangers, and (4) competitors’
disputes.48  Baker and Stabile view only the first two of these
categories as suitable for arbitration because of the continuing
or transaction-by-transaction contractual relationship between
the parties.49  By contrast, the remaining two categories, Baker
and Stabile assert, are generally not suitable for arbitration,
primarily due to the lack of privity between the parties.50
47. See Baker & Stabile, supra note 20, at 398–400. R
48. Partnership disputes are defined as “antitrust disputes between com-
mercial ‘partners’—parties to a continuing cooperative relationship—con-
cerning the terms of their contract.” Id. at 398.  They include horizontal
disputes between joint venture partners and vertical disputes between manu-
facturer and dealers, licensors and licensees, and franchisor and franchisees.
Id. at 398–99.  Bilateral buyer/seller disputes are “disputes between a buyer
and a seller who deal with each other on a transaction-by-transaction basis,
over the terms by which they conduct or refuse to conduct business.” Id. at
399.  This category covers “a broad range of alleged vertical or unilateral
activities—including secondary line price discrimination, tie-ins, resale or
use restrictions, refusal to deal, or other monopoly abuses.” Id. Disputes
over conspiracies with strangers, which are “claims by one party to a business
relationship that another party has conspired with outsiders to injure it by
suppressing competition,” include most horizontal conspiracies, such as
price-fixing, market division, and boycotts.  Id. at 399–400.  Competitors’ dis-
putes, which embrace “claims by one competitor that it has been, or is likely
to be, injured by the acts of one or more competitors,” encompasses such
claims as predatory pricing, refusal to deal, abuses by the monopolist, pri-
mary line price discrimination, and exclusive dealing.  Id. at 400.
49. Id. at 399 (“Partnership disputes generally are suitable for arbitration,
in part because of the ongoing relationship of the most relevant parties and
the ability to select an arbitrator with specialized skills.” (citation omitted));
id. (“[B]ilateral buyer/seller antitrust disputes may be quite suitable for arbi-
tration as part of a general arbitration scheme for contract disputes.” (cita-
tion omitted)).
50. Id. at 415 (“This type of dispute [where the plaintiff asserts that the
other party has conspired with third parties to the plaintiff’s detriment] is
much less suitable to arbitral resolution, even though the overall dispute has
a strong “contractual” flavor”); id. at 400 (“These [competitors’ disputes]
generally are between parties without privity.  Hence, there is no basis for
arbitration absent a joint venture which might then throw the disputes back
into the “partnership” category.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYI\48-3\NYI303.txt unknown Seq: 18  4-MAY-16 8:38
884 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS [Vol. 48:867
One can also distinguish stand-alone antitrust arbitrations
and arbitrations of follow-on damages claims.  The majority of
known antitrust arbitrations are stand-alone arbitrations.51
Such arbitrations typically involve a contractual relationship
between the parties initiated expressly to address antitrust
claims or instances where antitrust claims are invoked in paral-
lel or in defense to other claims brought in arbitration.  In
addition to stand-alone antitrust arbitrations, one can identify
antitrust arbitrations addressing follow-on damages claims
based on the violations of antitrust law already established by
public antitrust authorities.52  This latter category of claims is
exceptionally well suited for arbitration, and is expected to
grow because arbitral tribunals in most of these cases are re-
quired only to calculate the amount of awardable damages.53
2. The Peculiar Case of Commitment Arbitrations
Apart from conventional antitrust arbitrations based on
voluntary arbitration agreements between private parties to re-
solve their dispute by arbitration, a new type of antitrust arbi-
tration is emerging in the European Union.  The European
Commission has increasingly been imposing behavioral com-
mitments as a condition of merger approval between compa-
nies.54  Behavioral commitments may be supplemented by an
51. For instance, all fifty-five known ICC arbitration awards for the pe-
riod of 1964–2010 resulted from stand-alone antitrust arbitrations, not arbi-
trations of follow-on damages claims. Annex III: Table on ICC Arbitration
Awards Involving Antitrust Issues over the Period 1964–2010, in 2 EU and US
Antitrust Arbitration. A Handbook for Practitioners 2063–92 (Gordon
Blanke & Phillip Landolt eds., 2011).
52. See Francesca Richmond, Arbitrating Competition Law Disputes: A Matter
of Public Policy?, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Feb. 9, 2012), http://kluwerarbitration-
blog.com/blog/2012/02/09/arbitrating-competition-law-disputes-a-matter-
of-policy.
53. See Miriam Driessen-Reilly, Private Damages in EU Competition Law and
Arbitration: A Changing Landscape, 31 ARB. INT’L 567, 587 (2015) ([I]t seems
likely that we can expect to see an increase of some kind in the number of
cases involving EU competition law infringements going to arbitration, not
just as a defensive shield in commercial disputes, but potentially also as a
sword in the context of a claim for damages in the follow-up  to public en-
forcement). Id. (noting the advantages of arbitration in cases of follow-on
damages claims that involve a mere assessment of damages).
54. See Gordon Blanke, International Arbitration and ADR in Conditional EU
Merger Clearance Decisions, in 2 EU AND US ANTITRUST ARBITRATION: A HAND-
BOOK FOR PRACTITIONERS 1615–18 (Gordon Blanke & Phillip Landolt eds.,
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obligation to arbitrate55 and as such can lead to actual arbitra-
tions initiated by third-parties beneficiaries adversely affected
by a merged entity’s failure to comply with its commitment ob-
ligations.
Behavioral commitments are promises concerning future
behavior of the merged entity, such as to grant an actual or
potential competitor access to key technology, networks, or
key infrastructure.56  Commitments of this type seek to control
behavior of the merged entity following the merger in order to
preserve competition in the markets.  In contrast to one-time
structural remedies, such as divestiture of assets, behavioral
2011) (providing statistics and trends over time for the period of 1992 to
2009 with respect to conditional merger clearance decisions—including de-
cisions that employed arbitration commitments—used by the European
Commission in the context of the EU merger control).  Commitments are
most commonly imposed as a condition of merger approval under the EC
Merger Regulation. See Council Regulation 139/2004, on the Control of
Concentrations Between Undertakings, 2004 O.J. (L133) 1, 10–11 (EC).
55. See Commission Notice on Remedies Acceptable under the Council
Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 and under Commission Regulation (EC)
No. 802/2004, 2008 O.J. (C267) 1, ¶ 66 (EC) [hereinafter Commission No-
tice on Remedies] (“Measures allowing third parties themselves to enforce
the commitments are in particular access to a fast dispute resolution mecha-
nism via arbitration proceedings (together with trustees) or via arbitration
proceedings involving national regulatory authorities if existing for the mar-
kets concerned.” (footnotes omitted)).  The Commission may use either ad
hoc or institutional arbitration. See Patrick R. Wautelet, Arbitration in EU Com-
mission Cleared Merger Transactions (November 2004), http://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=970253 (giving the example of
the Vivendi decision, where the Commission imposed on the merging com-
panies an obligation to arbitrate under the ICC arbitration rules in front of a
three-member arbitral tribunal with the seat in London and English as the
language of the arbitration). See Commission Decision of 13 Oct. 2000, Non-
opposition to a Notified Concentration (Case COMP/M.2050 – Vivendi/Ca-
nal+/Seagram), 2000 O.J. (C 311) 3.
56. See Commission Notice on Remedies, supra note 55, ¶ 17 (“[A] gen- R
eral distinction can be made between divestitures, other structural remedies,
such as granting access to key infrastructure or inputs on non-discriminatory
terms, and commitments relating to the future behaviour of the merged en-
tity. . . . Commitments relating to the future behavior of the merged entity
may be acceptable only exceptionally in very specific circumstances.  In par-
ticular, commitments in the form of undertakings not to raise prices, to re-
duce product ranges or to remove brands, etc., will generally not eliminate
competition concerns resulting from horizontal overlaps.  In any case, those
types of remedies can only exceptionally be accepted if their workability is
fully ensured by effective implementation and monitoring . . . .”).
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commitments require continuous monitoring to guarantee
their effectiveness.57
To ensure compliance with behavioral commitments, the
Commission may rely on its own monitoring power, use the
monitoring trustee, or impose further conditions and obliga-
tions on the merged entity, such as an arbitration obligation.58
When an arbitration obligation is imposed, the beneficiary of
behavioral commitments (e.g., a competitor promised access
to an essential facility) monitors the behavior of the merged
entity and can trigger arbitration if it believes commitments
have not been observed.  The resulting arbitrations have been
referred to as “commitment” or “merger” arbitrations.59
The Axalto/Gemplus case,60 described in detail by a Euro-
pean Commission official,61 illustrates the type and structure
of commitment arbitration that can be imposed by the Com-
57. See Commission Notice on Remedies, supra note 55, ¶ 13 (“Whereas dives- R
titures, once implemented, do not require any further monitoring measures,
other types of commitments require effective monitoring mechanisms in or-
der to ensure that their effect is not reduced or even eliminated by the par-
ties.”).
58. Id. ¶ 66.  The Commission may also use combined monitoring em-
ploying both arbitration and a monitoring trustee. Id. ¶ 130 n.1 (providing
examples of the European Commission’s decisions using combined monitor-
ing, such as Commission Decision of 10 July 2002, Non-opposition to a Noti-
fied Concentration (Case COMP/M.2803 – Telia/Sonera), 2002 O.J. (C 201)
9; Commission Decision of 9 Sept. 2003, Declaring a Concentration to be
Compatible with the Common Market and the Functioning of the EEA
Agreement (Case COMP/M.3083 – GE/Instrumentarium), 2004 O.J. (L 109)
1; and Commission Decision of 29 Sept. 2003, Non-opposition to a Notified
Concentration (Case COMP/M.3225 – Alcan/Pechiney (II)), 2003 O.J. (C
299) 19).
59. See, e.g., Gordon Blanke, International Arbitration and ADR in Condi-
tional EU Merger Clearance Decision, in 2 EU AND US ANTITRUST ARBITRATION: A
HANDBOOK FOR PRACTITIONERS 1605-1724 (Gordon Blanke & Phillip Landolt
eds., 2011) (using the term “commitment arbitration”). See also Dempegi-
otis, supra note 4, at 145 (discussing “merger arbitrations,” by which the au- R
thor means arbitrations resulting from the “arbitration commitments under
the EC merger control regime”).
60. Commission Decision of 19 May 2006, Declaring a Concentration to
be Compatible with the Common Market (Case No. COMP/M.3998 - Axalto/
Gemplus) according to Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004, SG-Greffe
(2006) D/202682.
61. See Johannes Lu¨bking, The European Commission’s View on Arbitrating
Competition Law Issues, 19 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 77, 83–86 (2008) (describing the
European Commission’s consideration and details of the arbitration com-
mitment employed in the Axalto/Gemplus decision).
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mission on a proposed merger.  The case involved an acquisi-
tion by the Dutch company Axalto of the Luxembourg com-
pany Gemplus—both producers of smart cards.62  At the time
of the merger, Axalto and Gemplus owned a large patent port-
folio in the smart card industry and as such were “the main
actors of the IP landscape within the industry.”63  The Com-
mission feared that following a proposed merger the compa-
nies would “stop licensing the combined technology to com-
petitors . . . or that they would use the combined technology to
increase the cost of competitors via ‘patent attacks’ and
thereby to reduce effective competition in the market for
smart cards.”64  Hence, as a condition of merger clearance the
European Commission imposed behavioral commitments, in-
cluding a license commitment for a period of ten years, which
made it mandatory for the merged entity to grant to any third
party a non-exclusive license to manufacture and sell licensed
products in the European Union and anywhere outside of the
EU.65  In the event that any such third party felt that a license
was not granted as required, the pre-merger conditions also
imposed an obligation to arbitrate the matter.66
The dispute resolution clause employed by the Commis-
sion was exceptionally detailed.  It first provided for mediation
for a period of ten to fifteen days.67  If the mediation failed,
the parties could resort to arbitration conducted under the
ICC rules in Paris in front of a three-member arbitral tribu-
nal.68  French law was to be applied as the governing law, with
62. See Commission Decision of 19 May 2006, supra note 60, ¶ 1. R
63. See id. ¶ 55.
64. See Lu¨bking, supra note 61, at 83. R
65. For details of the commitments, see Commitments to the European Com-
mission, attached to Commission Decision of 19 May 2006, supra note 60, at 22. R
In particular, Section B (License Commitment) provided that “the Com-
bined Entity will, upon written request by any Third Party, grant a non-exclu-
sive license to such Third Party (the ‘Licensee’) under any or all (i.e., one,
several or all) Patent Families of the Combined Entity’s Patent Portfolio as at
the date such license is entered into to make, use, sell, and import Licensed
Products anywhere in the EEA, and to export Licensed Products anywhere
outside the EEA, on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory terms and con-
ditions.” Id.
66. For conditions of the arbitration commitment, see Commitments to
the European Commission, Section F (Fast Track Dispute Resolution), in
Commission Decision of 19 May 2006, supra note 60. R
67. Lu¨bking, supra note 61, at 84. R
68. Id. at 85.
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English as the language of the proceedings.  The parties were
to adopt the fast-track arbitration procedure, where the arbi-
tral tribunal was to “shorten all applicable procedural time-
limits under the [ICC] Rules as far as admissible and appropri-
ate in the circumstances.”69  There was to be only “one round
of written pleadings, containing all issues of fact and law sub-
mitted by the parties.”70  Along with the monitoring trustee,
both parties were to submit their proposals for a license to the
tribunal so that it could rely on three different forms of the
license when resolving the dispute and drawing up the terms
and conditions of the license.71  The European Commission
was to be fully and actively involved in the arbitration, includ-
ing the right to receive “all written submissions . . . ; all orders,
interim and final awards and other documents exchanged by
the Arbitral Tribunal with the Parties to the Arbitration . . . ;
the opportunity to file amicus curiae briefs; and . . . [be] pre-
sent at the hearing(s) and . . . allowed to ask questions to par-
ties, witnesses and experts.”72  The parties were to prepare “a
non-confidential version of the award, without business
secrets,” which could be published by the Commission.73
Given all the details of the Axalto/Gemplus arbitration
clause, the involvement of the European Commission in the
dispute resolution between private parties seems excessive, es-
pecially considering the Commission’s right to participate in
the arbitral proceeding.  Yet, it can be explained by the pecu-
liar nature of commitment arbitration where private dispute
resolution backs up public enforcement of EU competition
law by the Commission.  One can also argue that the Commis-
sion overstepped its authority with respect to the arbitral insti-
tution (the ICC) by choosing the ICC rules for commitment
arbitration, yet imposing its own modifications to the rules.
This latter problem could be avoided by instead relying on ad
hoc arbitration rules.
69. See Commitments to the European Commission, Section F (Fast
Track Dispute Resolution), ¶ 7, in Commission Decision of 19 May 2006,
supra note 60. R
70. Lu¨bking, supra note 61, at 84. R
71. Id. at 84–86.
72. See Commitments to the European Commission, Section F (Fast
Track Dispute Resolution), ¶ 11, in Commission Decision of 19 May 2006,
supra note 60. R
73. Id. ¶ 15.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYI\48-3\NYI303.txt unknown Seq: 23  4-MAY-16 8:38
2016] ARBITRATING ANTITRUST CLAIMS 889
Apart from the EU merger control, the European Com-
mission can accept behavioral commitments within the frame-
work of its review under Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU.74
Overall, since its 1992 decision in Elf/Minol,75 which became
the first decision to invoke arbitration in behavioral commit-
ments,76 the Commission has used arbitration commitments in
at least sixty-five conditional merger clearance decisions and
six decisions under Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003.77  Arbitra-
tion commitments are also known to the U.S. and Canadian
antitrust and regulatory authorities, which are reported to
have used them in at least eleven and seven commitment
cases, respectively.78
Behavioral commitments have now led to actual arbitra-
tions, as was the case with Sky Italia (a pay-TV channel owned
by the U.S. company News Corporation) in 2012.  Reportedly,
74. See Regulation 1/2003, supra note 24, art. 9(1) (“Where the Commis- R
sion intends to adopt a decision requiring that an infringement [of Article
101 or Article 102 of the TFEU] be brought to an end and the undertakings
concerned offer commitments to meet the concerns expressed to them by the
Commission in its preliminary assessment, the Commission may by decision
make those commitments binding on the undertakings.” (emphasis ad-
ded)).
75. Commission Decision of 04 Sept. 1992, declaring a concentration to
be compatible with the common market (Case No. IV/M.235 – Elf Aquitaine-
Thyssen/Minol), 1992 O.J. (C 232) 14, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/
mergers/cases/decisions/m235_en.pdf.
76. See Wautelet, supra note 58, at 2 (“The first such reference to arbitra- R
tion in a commitment, is to be found in a 1992 decision concerning Elf Aqui-
taine.”).
77. Gordon Blanke, EU Commitment Arbitrations—A Brief Introduction,
No. 1–2 (12–13) ARB. E-REV. 39, 40 (2013), http://www.sadarbitrazowy.org
.pl/magazine/default/index.html. See also Lu¨bking, supra note 61, at 77 (re- R
ferring to the fact that the Commission used arbitration to monitor merger
remedies in more than thirty cases).
78. See Daniel H. Margolis & Kenneth M. Vorrasi, Arbitration in US Anti-
trust Enforcement, in 2 EU AND EU ANTITRUST ARBITRATION, supra note 31, at R
1745, 1747–55 (providing data on the use of arbitration in the enforcement
actions by the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commis-
sion (FTC) in the United States). See J. William Rowley et al., Arbitration in
Merger Control Remedies: Lessons from the Canadian Experience, in 2 EU and EU
Antitrust Arbitration, supra note 31, at 1725, 1732–34 (providing data on the R
use of arbitration as merger remedies in Canada).  Additionally, for exam-
ples of arbitration commitments used by the U.S. Federal Communications
Commission (FCC), see General Motors Corporation and Hughes Electron-
ics Corporation, Transferors, and The News Corporation Limited, 19 FCC
Rcd. 473 (2004).
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the Sky Italia’s competitor Reti Televisive Italiane (RTI) (a
subsidiary of Mediaset, the largest commercial broadcasting
company in Italy), accused Sky Italia of violating EU competi-
tion law and breaching its commitments to the European
Commission by “acquir[ing] exclusive rights to broadcast the
2010 FIFA World Cup on pay-TV and refus[ing] to resell the
digital terrestrial rights.”79  RTI then initiated an ICC arbitra-
tion relying on the News Corporation’s commitment to arbi-
trate, which was incorporated into the 2003 European Com-
mission’s clearance decision permitting News Corporation to
acquire and merge two Italian pay-TVs—Telepiu` and
Stream—in order to create a single Direct-to-Home (DTH)
satellite pay-TV platform to be operated by Sky Italia.80  In in-
ternational arbitration, RTI first sought specific performance
(asking the tribunal to order Sky Italia to sell the digital terres-
trial rights), but then changed its claim to damages seeking to
compensate lost revenue due to its own inability to broadcast
the World Cup).81  The arbitrators rejected the RTI’s claims.
In doing so, they held that the commitments made to the Eu-
ropean Commission “regarding the ‘world-wide sports rights’
did not cover the World Cup.”82  The tribunal further found
79. Matthew Pountney, Sky Italia Wins Dispute over World Cup, GLOBAL
ARB. REV. (Feb. 24, 2012), http://globalarbitrationreview.com/b/30199/.
See generally Luca Radicati Di Brozolo, EU Merger Control Commitments and Arbi-
tration: Reti Televisive Italiane, 29(2) ARB. INT’L 223 (2013).
80. Commission Decision 2004/311/EC of 2 Apr. 2003, Declaring a Con-
centration to be Compatible with the Common Market and the EEA Agree-
ment (Case COMP/M.2876 – Newscorp/Telepiu`), 2004 O.J. (L 110) 73.  For
details of the commitments made by News Corporation, see Commission De-
cision of 2 Apr. 2003, Declaring a Concentration to be Compatible with the
Common Market and the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/M.2876 – New-
scorp/Telepiu`), Annex: Undertakings Submitted by Newscorp on Mar. 13,
2003 (Non-Confidential Version), Substantive Obligations, Pt. II at 6–17, C
(2003) 1082 final (Apr. 2, 2003), http://ec.europa.eu/competition/merg-
ers/cases/decisions/m2876_en.pdf.  For a detailed arbitration commitment,
see id. ¶ 5(b) at 16, which in a relevant part provided for an ICC arbitration
to be conducted in Milan in English. See also id. ¶ 15(b)(vii) at 16 (“Deci-
sions of the arbitrators shall be final and binding on all persons submitting
to arbitration. Nothing in this Arbitration shall affect the powers of the Com-
mission to take decisions in relation to the Commitments in accordance with
its powers under the Merger Regulation and the EC Treaty. Nothing in the
arbitration process above shall affect the powers of the ICA under the rele-
vant national regulations”).
81. Pountney, supra note 79. R
82. Id.
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that the World Cup event was “not crucial to competition in
the Italian pay-TV broadcasting market” because “it is held
only once every four years.”83
It remains to be seen how commitment arbitrations will
ultimately influence antitrust arbitrations in general.  To date,
their contribution has not been significant because there is
only a single reported case of an actual arbitral proceeding
under the arbitration commitment, which proved to be not so
different from the ordinary international arbitration.  Overall,
the arbitration community has welcomed the use of commit-
ment arbitrations.  Commentators have pointed out that arbi-
tration is well suited (often better than national courts) for
solving antitrust disputes, including disputes that may arise in
the post-merger context.84  Reliance on arbitration by Euro-
pean public antitrust authorities to ensure compliance with be-
havioral commitments in the context of merger review attests
to the fact that arbitration, including international arbitration,
has become a trusted forum for the enforcement of antitrust
laws.
B. Antitrust as Mandatory Law and Public Policy
The specificity of antitrust arbitration derives from the
mandatory nature of antitrust law,85 which can be so funda-
mental for a particular legal system that non- or mis-applica-
tion of such law by the tribunal may be considered a public
policy violation.86  In international arbitration, the term
83. Id.
84. See, e.g., Carl Nisser & Gordon Blanke, ICC Draft Best Practice Note on
the European Commission Acting as Amicus Curiae in International Arbitration Pro-
ceedings – An Explanatory Note, 19 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 193, 197 (2008). See also
Luca G. Radicati Di Brozolo, Arbitration in EC Merger Control: Old Wine in a
New Bottle, 19 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 7, 12 (2008).
85. See, e.g., Phillip Landolt, Arbitration and Antitrust: An Overview of EU
and National Case Law, in 2013 COMPETITION CASE LAW DIGEST A SYNTHESIS
OF EU AND NATIONAL LEADING CASES 231, 232 (Nicholas Charbit et al. eds.,
2012) [hereinafter Landolt, Arbitration and Antitrust] (“[S]tatutory rights
such as those under the Sherman Act are often intended to be mandatory,
and may not therefore be attenuated by private agreement”).
86. See, for example, MDI v. Van Raalte (decision of 24 March 2005),
supra note 10, where the Dutch courts refused to enforce an award rendered R
in the United States under the AAA rules and Michigan governing law be-
cause a contract at issue was found to be in violation of EU competition law
and therefore the public policy.
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“mandatory law” is used to designate the law from which the
parties cannot derogate by agreement.87  EU competition law,
in particular, is mandatory for the parties because it is the Eu-
ropean Union law, which, as the ECJ explained, cannot be cir-
cumvented by contract between private parties.88
Mandatory law is most commonly discussed in the context
of the governing law—the law to be applied to the merits of
the parties’ dispute.  Mandatory law requirements may deter-
mine the outcome of a dispute in addition to or despite the
choice of law made by the parties.  Additional mandatory law
provisions may stem from other systems of law that have bear-
ing on international arbitration: most importantly, the law gov-
erning the arbitration agreement, the law of the seat of arbitra-
tion, and the law of the place of enforcement.89
Furthermore, in contrast to domestic arbitration, interna-
tional arbitration may require attention to mandatory law and
considerations of public policy of several jurisdictions.  Provi-
sions of such laws may contradict each other, requiring the
tribunal to choose one set of mandatory laws over the other.90
For instance, where the law of a third country is chosen by the
parties as applicable to their dispute, the arbitrators may have
to take into account the antitrust law of the seat of arbitration,
or an anticipated country of enforcement, or the law of the
country with the closest connection to the contract.91  Other-
wise, the arbitral award may be set aside or refused enforce-
87. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 65/22, UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, art. 1(3)
(Jan. 10, 2011) (referring to mandatory law as “the law applicable to the
arbitration from which the parties cannot derogate”).
88. Case 102/81, Nordsee v. Reederei Mond, 1982 E.C.R. 1095, 1111
¶ 14 (“parties to a contract are not . . . free to create exceptions to [Euro-
pean Union law]”).
89. BLACKABY ET AL., supra note 11, ¶ 3.07 (referring to at least five differ- R
ent systems of law that bear on an international arbitration).
90. William W. Park, National Law and Commercial Justice: Safeguarding Pro-
cedural Integrity in International Arbitration, 63 TUL. L. REV. 647, 667 (1989)
[hereinafter Park, National Law and Commercial Justice] (“[i]n a transnational
dispute the arbitrator dealing with sensitive public law issues must look over
his shoulder at national constraints imposed by the seat of the arbitration,
the place of contract performance, and the situs of the loser’s assets.  Not
only must he be attentive to more than one legal system, but he must also
juggle dictates that are not always consistent.”).
91. See, for instance, the facts of Mitsubishi where the U.S. federal anti-
trust law was admitted by the tribunal in arbitration, in part, as the law of the
anticipated place of enforcement, although the governing law was Swiss and
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ment on the grounds of public policy,92 placing arbitrators at
risk of breaching their obligation to the parties to produce an
enforceable arbitral award.
One should also keep in mind that antitrust law has its
own rules of application, commonly determined by the object
or effect of the allegedly anticompetitive agreements or prac-
tices on trade or competition in the markets.93  Furthermore,
both U.S. antitrust law (in particular, Sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act94) and EU competition law (Articles 101 and 102
of the TFEU) are of extraterritorial application.  These rules
may have to be considered by arbitral tribunals where the con-
tract at the center of a dispute has direct effects on the U.S.
and EU markets, even if the contract was concluded and per-
formed outside of these jurisdictions.  Thus, irrespective of the
will of the parties, which may choose to arbitrate abroad and
apply the substantive law of a third country, the applicability of
antitrust law in international arbitration may ultimately be de-
termined by its own criteria of application established in such
law.  This has been referred to by Radicati Di Brozolo as the
“self-connection” principle of antitrust law.95
Antitrust law is also deemed so fundamental that it is
often considered to be a part of the public policy of a given
the seat of arbitration was in Japan.  Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 636–37 n.19 (1985).
92. See New York Convention, supra note 5, art. V(2)(b); UNCITRAL R
Model Law, supra note 6, art. 34(2)(b)(ii). R
93. See, e.g., TFEU, supra note 32, art. 101 (prohibiting as “incompatible R
with the internal market: all agreements between undertakings, decisions by
associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade
between Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention,
restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market”) (em-
phasis added). See also Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (declaring illegal
“[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspir-
acy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations” (emphasis added)).
94. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2.
95. See, e.g., Luca G. Radicati Di Brozolo, Arbitration and Competition Law:
The Position of the Courts and of Arbitrators, 27 J. LONDON COURT INT’L ARB. 1,
20 (2011) [hereinafter Radicati Di Brozolo, Arbitration and Competition Law]
(“The applicability of [antitrust] rules by virtue of their own criteria . . .
could be justified following an approach based on the principle of ‘self-con-
nection’ of mandatory rules . . . propounded by some French scholars.”).
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jurisdiction, as decisions in Mitsubishi and Eco Swiss suggest.96
For instance, there is general agreement among European
courts and commentators that EU competition law is an inte-
gral part of the public policy of the European Union.97  Being
central to the EU legal order, European competition law is to
be applied by courts and arbitral tribunals sitting in the EU
Member States, but is also expected to be applied by non-EU
courts and arbitral tribunals sitting outside of the European
Union when the agreement or practice “affect[s] trade be-
tween Member States and . . . ha[s] as their object or effect the
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the
[European Union’s] internal market.”98
The concept of “public policy” is well known to the law
and practice of international arbitration thanks to the New
York Convention, which permits a court to refuse recognition
or enforcement of an arbitral award if the award is contrary to
the public policy of the country.99  However, the Convention
does not define public policy, leaving in practice such determi-
nation to the domestic laws of the contracting states.  It thus
gives to the state the freedom to determine the most essential
notions and principles that constitute its public policy, and the
power to refuse recognition and enforcement of awards that
violate its public policy.  Following the New York Convention,
domestic arbitration laws have commonly included public pol-
icy as a ground for setting aside arbitral awards.100  Again, the
96. See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. 638 (“Having permitted the arbitration to go
forward, the national courts of the United States will have the opportunity at
the award-enforcement stage to ensure that the legitimate interest in the
enforcement of the antitrust laws has been addressed.  The [New York] Con-
vention reserves to each signatory country the right to refuse enforcement of
an award where the “recognition or enforcement of the award would be con-
trary to the public policy of that country.” (citation omitted)); Case C-126/
97, Eco Swiss China Time Ltd v. Benetton Int’l, 1999 E.C.R. I-3093 at ¶ 39
(“provisions of Article 85 of the Treaty may be regarded as a matter of public
policy within the meaning of the New York Convention”).
97. See, e.g., Laurence Idot, The Role of Arbitration in Competition Disputes, in
THE REFORM OF EC COMPETITION LAW: NEW CHALLENGES 75, 91 (Ioannis Lia-
nos & Ioannis Kokkoris eds., 2010) (“There is no doubt that competition law
in general, and EC law in particular, are an integral part of public policy,
within the meaning of the legal provisions on the review of arbitral award.”).
98. TFEU, supra note 32, art. 101. R
99. New York Convention, supra note 5, art. V(2)(b). R
100. See, e.g., United Kingdom Arbitration Act 1996, c. 23, §68(2)(g);
NOUVEAU CODE DE PROCE´DURE CIVILE [N.C.P.C.] [NEW CIVIL PROCEDURE
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statutes usually do not define public policy, thus allowing a
case-by-case determination and a certain leeway for courts in
exercising control over international arbitrations within their
jurisdiction.
Being “notoriously difficult to define,”101 public policy is
generally understood as the “fundamental notions of a particu-
lar legal system,”102 or, as a U.S. Court of Appeals famously
held, the “most basic notions of morality and justice.”103  Na-
tional laws on international arbitration may distinguish “do-
mestic” and “international” public policy, or use both in differ-
ent contexts,104 most commonly as a ground to set aside or
refuse enforcement.105  France, for example, permits the set-
ting aside of an international arbitration award only where its
recognition and enforcement is contrary to international pub-
lic policy.106  By contrast, Swiss international arbitration law al-
CODE] arts. 1488, 1520 (Fr.); BUNDESGESETZ U¨BER DAS INTERNATIONALE PRIVA-
TRECHT [IPRG] [FEDERAL STATUTE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW], Dec. 18,
1987, as amended up to July 1, 2014, AS 1776 (1988), art. 190(2)(e) (Switz).
See also UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 6, art. 34(2)(b)(ii). R
101. See Bernard Hanotiau & Olivier Caprasse, Public Policy in International
Commercial Arbitration, in ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AND IN-
TERNATIONAL ARBITRAL AWARDS 787, 788 (Emmanuel Gaillard & Domenico
Di Pietro eds., 2008).
102. Id. at 789.
103. See Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co., Inc. v. Socie´te´ Ge´ne´rale de
l’Industrie du Papier (Rakta), 508 F.2d 969, 974 (2d Cir. 1974).
104. See WILLIAM W. PARK, ARBITRATION OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS DIS-
PUTES 219 (2nd ed. 2012) (suggesting that “[t]he adjectives ‘domestic’ and
‘international’ apply not to the source of the policy but rather to their field
of application” (footnote omitted)).
105. See UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 6, art. 34(2)(b)(ii) (allowing R
the court to set aside an arbitral award if the court finds that “the award is in
conflict with the public policy of this State”); id. art. 36(1)(b)(ii) (allowing
the court to refuse recognition or enforcement of an arbitral award if the
court finds that “the recognition or enforcement of the award would be con-
trary to the public policy of this State.”).  The provisions of the Model Law
serve as a good indicator of the common practice among sovereign states as
to date seventy-two countries (102 jurisdictions) have adopted domestic laws
on international commercial arbitration based on the Model Law. See
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Status: UNCI-
TRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (1985), with
amendments as adopted in 2006, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/un
citral_texts/arbitration/1985Model_arbitration_status.html.
106. See NEW CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, art. 1520(5) (Fr.).
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lows the award to be annulled if it is incompatible with public
policy.107
Considering its mandatory and (arguably) public policy
nature, the applicability of antitrust law in international arbi-
tration often depends in practice upon the seat of arbitration
and anticipated place of enforcement.  When the seat of arbi-
tration is located in the European Union, for example, the ar-
bitrators will have to apply EU competition law because it is a
part of the public policy of the member states, and breach of
the public policy of lex arbitri may lead to setting aside of the
award.108  And so, if a claim is made in an international arbi-
tration that a contract is void for violating EU competition law,
but the tribunal declines to rule on this claim, the award can
be set aside in a member state (e.g., under French law it can
be done on infra petita grounds).109  On the other hand, if the
seat of arbitration is outside the European Union, failure to
apply European competition law will generally not lead to set-
ting aside of an award on grounds of public policy in the re-
spective non-EU country.  Still, arbitral tribunals sitting
outside the European Union may apply European competition
law when it is the law of the contract.110  They may also con-
sider European competition law seeking to ensure enforce-
ment of the award in the European Union, where failure to
assess questions of EU competition law can lead to denial of
enforcement on the public policy ground of the New York
Convention.111
107. See FEDERAL STATUTE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, art. 190(2)(e)
(Switz).
108. Hans van Houtte, The Application by Arbitrators of Articles 81 & 82 and
Their Relationship with the European Commission, 19 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 63, 65
(2008).
109. FOUCHARD GAILLARD GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBI-
TRATION ¶ 582 (Emmanuel Gaillard & John Savage eds., 1999) [hereinafter
FOUCHARD GAILLARD GOLDMAN].
110. Van Houtte, supra note 108, at 66–68. R
111. See Case C-126/97, Eco Swiss China Time Ltd v. Benetton Int’l, 1999
E.C.R. I-3055, I-3093 (“It follows that where its domestic rules of procedure
require a national court to grant an application for annulment of an arbitra-
tion award where such an application is founded on failure to observe na-
tional rules of public policy, it must also grant such an application where it is
founded on failure to comply with the prohibition laid down in Article 85(1)
of the Treaty . . . . [T]he provisions of Article 85 of the Treaty may be re-
garded as a matter of public policy within the meaning of the New York
Convention.”).
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Courts across jurisdictions are generally reluctant to use
public policy as a ground for challenging arbitral awards, re-
serving it for the most egregious violations.  To date, instances
of its successful application are few.112  The courts of third
countries also do not have to respect the mandatory and pub-
lic policy nature of the U.S. and EU antitrust law when such
laws are implicated in setting aside or enforcement proceed-
ings.  For instance, the Swiss courts have stated that the alleged
violation of EU competition law in the award does not rise to
the level of public policy violation that warrants the annulment
of an award on public policy grounds.113
Hence, even with respect to the U.S. and EU competition
laws there is no uniformity across jurisdictions as to their rele-
vance for public policy as a ground for challenge of arbitral
awards.  However, parties continue trying to set aside or fight
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards on public pol-
icy grounds.  Following the Mitsubishi decision in the United
States and Eco Swiss in the European Union, non-application
or improper consideration by the arbitral tribunal of relevant
antitrust laws has increasingly been invoked by the losing party
in arbitration as a violation of public policy and therefore a
ground for challenging arbitral awards in setting aside and en-
forcement proceedings.114
III. ANTITRUST ARBITRATION AND THE COURTS: THREE
PHASES OF THE RELATIONSHIP
The relationship between arbitral tribunals and national
courts has a long history that has evolved significantly over
time.  This evolution began decades prior to Mitsubishi,115 with
the overwhelming suspicion of national courts of the ability of
arbitral tribunals to resolve antitrust claims.  The courts at the
time were mainly concerned that public policy implications of
112. See BLACKABY ET AL., supra note 11, ¶ 11.104 (observing that English R
courts are reluctant to use public policy as a ground for refusing enforce-
ment so that there is only a single known case where a court in England
invoked public policy to refuse enforcement of an award).
113. See Tribunal Fe´de´ral [TF] [Federal Supreme Court] Mar. 8, 2006,
Arreˆts du Tribunal fe´de´ral suisse [ATF] 2006 REVUE DE L’ARBITRAGE [REV.
ARB.] 763 (Switz.).
114. See court cases analyzed infra Parts III.B and III.C.
115. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 614 (1985).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYI\48-3\NYI303.txt unknown Seq: 32  4-MAY-16 8:38
898 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS [Vol. 48:867
antitrust disputes would not be considered in private dispute
resolution.116  They therefore resisted the arbitrability of anti-
trust law, preserving domestic courts’ exclusive jurisdiction
over antitrust claims.  The tension between the prerogatives of
national courts in, on the one hand, ensuring enforcement of
domestic antitrust laws and, on the other hand, supporting ar-
bitration of international commercial disputes, gradually
pushed the courts towards greater support of international ar-
bitration.  Once the arbitrability of antitrust law was estab-
lished,117 it opened the doors to antitrust arbitrations.  Over
time, courts’ attitude towards ability of arbitral tribunals to ap-
ply domestic antitrust laws had transformed.
The history of this relationship is best illustrated by the
court cases analyzed below, where the focus has shifted from
the issue of the arbitrability of antitrust law to the proper stan-
dard of review of antitrust-related arbitral awards in setting
aside and enforcement proceedings.  Most recently a new wave
of cases, marking the newest phase of this relationship, has ad-
dressed the obligation of the arbitrator to raise antitrust con-
cerns in arbitral proceeding sua sponte, or, failing to do so, face
the risk of delivering a non-enforceable arbitral award.
A. Phase I: Arbitrability Fought for and Established
While international and domestic arbitration today are
universally recognized, states have always kept limitations on
116. See, e.g., Am. Safety Equip. Corp. v. J. P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821,
826 (2d Cir. 1968) (“it is the business community generally that is regulated
by the antitrust laws.  Since commercial arbitrators are frequently men
drawn for their business expertise, it hardly seems proper for them to deter-
mine these issues of great public interest”); Aimcee Wholesale Corp. v. To-
mar Prods., Inc.,  237 N.E.2d 223, 225 (1968) (“[t]he evil is that, if the en-
forcement of antitrust policies is left in the hands of arbitrators, erroneous
decisions will have adverse consequences for the public in general, and the
guardians of the public interest, the courts, will have no say in the results
reached”). See also Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 410 F.Supp. 10 (S.D.N.Y. 1975);
A. & E. Plastik Pak Co. v. Monsanto Co., 396 F.2d 710 (9th Cir. 1968).
117. See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 614–15. See also Eco Swiss China Time Ltd.,
1999 E.C.R. I-3055 (indirectly endorsing the arbitrability of EC competition
law by holding that a failure to apply such law in arbitration can be a ground
for annulment of an award for violation of the public policy within the
meaning of the New York Convention; the European Court of Justice (ECJ)
thus acknowledged that the issues of EU competition law can be addressed
in international arbitration).
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the subject matter of disputes that can be resolved by arbitra-
tion, first and foremost through the concept of arbitrability.118
Such limitations restrict the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals
over claims irrespective of the will of the parties to have their
dispute resolved by arbitration.
The issue of arbitrability may be raised in front of a court
or an arbitral tribunal, most commonly, in actions to enforce
the arbitration agreement, to set aside or recognize and en-
force the arbitral award, or during the arbitration itself.  The
court in these cases will generally rely on its own law (lex
fori),119 while the arbitral tribunal will often apply the law gov-
erning the arbitration agreement, but may also consider the
law of the seat of arbitration.120  Other laws that may have to
be taken into account include the law governing the parties or
the law chosen by the parties to apply to their agreement.121
1. The Arbitrability of U.S. Antitrust Law
In addressing the arbitrability of antitrust law, U.S. courts
initially advanced several reasons for the perceived unsuitabil-
ity of arbitration for resolution of antitrust disputes, including
the complexity of antitrust claims and the danger of enforcing
arbitration clauses incorporated into the contracts of adhe-
118. See, e.g., New York Convention, supra note 5, art. II(1) (defining the R
arbitration agreement, the Convention refers to “a subject matter capable of
settlement by arbitration”). See also European Convention on International
Commercial Arbitration art. VI(2), Apr. 21, 1961, 484 U.N.T.S. 364.
119. See TIBOR VA´RADY ET AL., INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: A
TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 264–65 (5th ed. 2012) (referring to the Court
of Appeal of Bologna decision in Coveme SpA (Italy) v. Compagnie Franc¸aise des
Isolants SA (France), App., Bologna, 21 dicembre 1991, n. 1786, translated in
18 Y.B. COMM. ARB. 422 (1993), where the Italian court applied Italian law to
the issue of arbitrability, while the arbitration clause provided for the ICC
arbitration in Paris under French governing law).
120. See generally Bernard Hanotiau, The Law Applicable to Arbitrability, 26
SINGAPORE ACADEMY L.J. 874 (discussing the law that could be applied to
determine the issue of arbitrability in international arbitration).
121. See BLACKABY ET AL., supra note 11, ¶ 2.115 (“If the issue of arbi- R
trability arises, it is necessary to have regard to the relevant laws of the differ-
ent States that are or may be concerned.  These are likely to include the law
governing the party involved, where the agreement is with a State or State
entity; the law governing the arbitration agreement; the law of the seat of
arbitration; and the law of the ultimate place of enforcement of the
award.”).
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sion.122  More often, the courts pointed to the dual nature of
antitrust claims, which seek to provide antitrust relief to pri-
vate parties, but have direct consequences on the public inter-
est of ensuring free competition in the markets.  These courts
raised concerns as to whether private adjudicators would be
sensitive to public interests, capable of performing both pri-
vate and public functions.123  The courts were reluctant to en-
force arbitration agreements related to “core” public law
claims, such as antitrust, fearing that private adjudicators may
under-enforce laws intended to protect society as a whole.124
In American Safety Equipment Corp. v. J. P. Maguire & Co.125
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit pronounced
four main reasons against expanding arbitrability to antitrust
law issues.  First, the court emphasized the public interest im-
plicated by antitrust violations: “A claim under the antitrust
laws is not merely a private matter. . . .  Antitrust violations can
affect hundreds of thousands—perhaps millions—of people
and inflict staggering economic damage. . . .  We do not be-
lieve that Congress intended such claims to be resolved else-
where than in the courts.”126
Second, the court expressed concerns over possible exis-
tence of standard arbitration clauses in contracts with monop-
olists, and expressed doubts as to “whether contracts of adhe-
sion between alleged monopolists and their customers should
determine the forum for trying antitrust violations.”127  Third,
the court referred to the complexity of antitrust litigation and
the extensiveness and diversity of the evidence involved, which
in the eyes of the court made antitrust claims inappropriate
for an arbitration mechanism designed for simpler controver-
sies.  Finally, the Court stated that it would be improper for
122. See American Safety, 391 F.2d at 827 (“[I]t is also proper to ask
whether contracts of adhesion between alleged monopolists and their cus-
tomers should determine the forum for trying antitrust violations.  Here
again, we think that Congress would hardly have intended that.”).
123. For further discussion on private adjudicators and the public interest
see, for example, PARK, supra note 104, at 209–29. R
124. See, e.g., Hunt, 410 F.Supp. at 25 (“It is now cardinal doctrine that the
public interest in the enforcement of the antiturst [sic] laws makes antitrust
claims inappropriate subjects for arbitration.” (footnote omitted)).
125. 391 F.2d 821.
126. Id. at 826–27.
127. Id. at 827.
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commercial arbitrators, often chosen for their business exper-
tise, to determine issues of great public interest.128  Conse-
quently, for a period of time it was firmly established in U.S.
law that federal antitrust claims were not arbitrable, and could
therefore only be brought in U.S. federal courts.129
This all changed with the U.S. Supreme Court decision in
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,130 where
the Court firmly established the arbitrability of federal anti-
trust law in the United States.  In Mitsubishi, a dispute arose
out of sales and distribution agreements signed in 1979 by a
Puerto Rican automobile dealer (Soler) with a Japanese auto-
mobile manufacturer (Mitsubishi) and a Swiss automobile dis-
tributor (CISA).  The sales agreement was subject to Swiss law
and provided for arbitration in Japan in accordance with the
rules and regulations of the Japan Commercial Arbitration As-
sociation.  After initial success in the distribution of Mitsubishi-
manufactured vehicles in the territory of Puerto Rico, assigned
to it in the contract, Soler agreed to an increase of the mini-
mum sales volume.  However, it was soon unable to meet the
new sales quota and felt compelled to ask Mitsubishi to delay
or cancel several orders.131  Soler then sought permission from
Mitsubishi to trans-ship some vehicles for sale in continental
United States and Latin America.132  When Mitsubishi refused,
the dispute escalated, and Mitsubishi brought an action
against Soler in a district court in Puerto Rico, seeking to com-
pel arbitration.  It then commenced arbitration in Japan.
Soler counterclaimed, alleging that Mitsubishi and CISA had
conspired to divide markets in restraint of trade in violation of
Section 1 of the Sherman Act,133 a principal U.S. antitrust stat-
ute.
In view of the international character of the parties’ ar-
rangement, the district court ordered the parties to arbitrate
128. Id. at 827–28.
129. See Baker & Stabile, supra note 20, at 401–03 (observing the original R
hostility of U.S. courts to the idea of arbitrating antitrust claims until the
turning point with the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Mitsubishi).
130. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler–Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614 (1985).
131. Id. at 617.
132. Id. at 617–18.
133. 15 U.S.C. § 1
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their claims, including those under the Sherman Act.134  The
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed in part and re-
versed in part, having read the arbitration clause to encompass
claims arising under the Sherman Act.135  The U.S. Supreme
Court granted certiorari primarily to address the issue of the
arbitrability of U.S. antitrust claims in international arbitra-
tion.136
In establishing the arbitrability of antitrust law, the U.S.
Supreme Court relied on several rationales.  In line with the
strong U.S. pro-arbitration policy, it held that there were no
reasons to depart from rigorous enforcement of arbitration
agreements where a party raised claims founded on statutory
rights.137  It also invoked “concerns of international comity, re-
spect for the capacities of foreign and transnational tribunals,
and sensitivity to the need of the international commercial sys-
tem for predictability in the resolution of disputes”—all war-
ranting the expansion of arbitrability to statutory antitrust
claims.138  The Court then addressed the American Safety con-
cerns and weighed them against “a strong belief in the efficacy
of arbitral procedures for the resolution of international com-
mercial disputes and an equal commitment to the enforce-
ment of freely negotiated choice-of-forum clauses.”139  The
concerns related to the adhesion contracts were found by the
Court to be unjustified.  According to the Court, “[t]he mere
appearance of an antitrust dispute does not alone warrant in-
validation of the selected forum on the undemonstrated as-
sumption that the arbitration clause is tainted.”140  Similarly,
the antitrust complexity argument did not persuade the Court,
which held that the potential complexity of antitrust disputes
“should not suffice to ward off arbitration,” particularly since
arbitration offers “adaptability and access to expertise,” where
the subject matter of a dispute may be taken into account dur-
ing the appointment of arbitrators.141  The Court also rejected
134. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 620.
135. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler-Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 723 F.2d
155 (1st Cir. 1983), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
136. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 616.
137. Id. at 626.
138. Id. at 629.
139. Id. at 631.
140. Id. at 632.
141. Id. at 633–34.
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the argument that arbitrators, potentially chosen from the bus-
iness community, would be hostile to the constraints on busi-
ness conduct, which are imposed by antitrust law.142
The Supreme Court thus expressed trust in the ability of
arbitral tribunal to recognize antitrust violations and apply
U.S. antitrust law, even in cases where the seat of arbitration is
outside of the United States and the arbitral tribunal is there-
fore beyond the supervisory power of U.S. courts.  Starting
with Mitsubishi, antitrust claims under the Sherman Act,143 the
Clayton Act,144 and the Robinson-Patman Act,145 are now con-
sidered suitable for international arbitration, and will be re-
ferred to arbitral tribunals as long as the parties have agreed to
arbitrate them.146
2. The Arbitrability of EU Competition Law
Competition law issues are also generally arbitrable in the
European Union and most of its member states; it is no longer
disputed in the European Union that the civil law conse-
quences of antitrust violations can now be addressed in arbitra-
142. Id. at 634.
143. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (prohibiting anticompetitive agreements and mo-
nopolies).
144. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27 (prohibiting price discrimination, exclusive deal-
ing, tying, and mergers and acquisitions that may lessen competition or cre-
ate a monopoly).
145. 15 U.S.C. §13 (prohibiting anticompetitive practices, such as price
discrimination).
146. For cases addressing antitrust issues in the context of arbitration, see
JLM Indus., Inc. v. Stolt-Nielsen SA, 387 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2004); Inv. Part-
ners, L.P. v. Glamour Shots Licensing, Inc., 298 F.3d 314 (5th Cir. 2002);
Seacoast Motors of Salisbury, Inc. v. DaimlerChrysler Motors, Corp., 271
F.3d 6 (1st Cir. 2001); Simula, Inc. v. Autoliv, Inc., 175 F.3d 716 (9th Cir.
1999); Nghiem v. NEC Elec., Inc., 25 F.3d 1437 (9th Cir. 1994); Cindy’s Can-
dle Co. v. WNS, Inc., 714 F. Supp. 973 (N.D. Ill. 1989), supplemented, 721 F.
Supp. 167 (N.D. Ill. 1989).  For more recent cases, see In re Titanium Diox-
ide Antitrust Litigation, 962 F.Supp.2d 840 (D. Md. 2013); Breckenridge
Edison Dev., L.C. v. Sheraton Operating Corp., No. 13 CV 6804(VB)
(S.D.N.Y. filed Sept. 18, 2014); In re A2P SMS Antitrust Litigation, 972
F.Supp.2d 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); AASI Creditor Liquidating Trust v. AU Op-
tronics Corp. (In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig.) No. M 07-1827
(N.D. Cal., Feb. 9, 2012).
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tion.147  The ECJ has never expressly dealt with the issue of the
arbitrability of EU competition law in a case equivalent to Mit-
subishi. However, it is commonly understood that the ECJ en-
dorsed the arbitrability of EU competition law indirectly
through its famous decision in Eco Swiss China Time Ltd v.
Benetton International NV.148  In Eco Swiss, a licensing agreement
concluded by the Dutch company Benetton (the licensor)
with the Hong Kong company Eco Swiss and the American
company Bulova Watch Company Inc., granted Eco Swiss the
right to produce “watches and clocks bearing the words
‘Benetton by Bulova’, which could then be sold by Eco Swiss
and Bulova.”149  The agreement provided for the resolution of
all disputes by arbitration in the Netherlands and contained a
Dutch choice of law clause.150  Upon early termination of the
agreement by Benetton and the resulting dispute, the parties
proceeded to arbitration.151  The arbitral tribunal ordered
Benetton to compensate Eco Swiss and Bulova for damages.152
During arbitration, none of the parties raised antitrust argu-
ments, although the licensing agreement provided for market
sharing in violation of Article 101 of the TFEU.153  Once the
147. See Landolt, Arbitration and Antitrust, supra note 85, at 239 n.14 (pro- R
viding examples of court cases from various European jurisdictions address-
ing the arbitrability of competition law issues).
148. See Case C-126/97, Eco Swiss China Time Ltd v. Benetton Int’l, 1999
E.C.R. I-3055. See also Landolt, Arbitration and Antitrust, supra note 85, at 233 R
(“There is no decision of the EU legal order explicitly pronouncing EU com-
petition law to be arbitrable, although this is not doubted since it is an infer-
ence which can be drawn from a number of decisions of the [ECJ].”).
149. Eco Swiss 1999 E.C.R ¶ 9.
150. Id. ¶ 10 (The arbitration clause provided that “all disputes or differ-
ences arising between the parties are to be settled by arbitration in conform-
ity with the rules of the Nederlands Arbitrage Instituut (Netherlands Insti-
tute of Arbitrators) and that the arbitrators appointed are to apply Nether-
lands law.”)
151. Id. ¶ 11 (The licensing agreement was concluded for a term of eight
years, but Benetton chose to terminate it three years prior to the end.).
152. Id. ¶ 12–13 (Under the final award, Benetton was to pay $23,750,000
to Eco Swiss and $2,800,000 to Bulova.).
153. Id. ¶ 14 (“During the arbitration proceedings neither the parties nor
the arbitrators had raised the point that the licensing agreement might be
contrary to that provision [of Article 101 of the TFEU].”).  The issue of the
EU competition law violation arose because of the market-sharing provision
of the licensing agreement, which prohibited Eco Swiss from selling in Italy
watches and clocks manufactured under the agreement. Id. ¶ 21.  It also
prohibited Bulova from selling such products in other countries of the Euro-
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award was granted, Benetton applied for an annulment in a
Dutch court on the public policy ground, claiming that the
agreement at issue violated EU competition law.154
The ECJ, to which the issue was referred for a preliminary
ruling, noted that to ensure efficiency of arbitration, the scope
of review of arbitral awards should be limited, with only excep-
tional circumstances leading to annulment or non-recognition
of an award.155  However, it also underlined the central role of
EU competition law for the “accomplishment of the tasks en-
trusted to the Community and, in particular, for the function-
ing of the internal market.”156  It therefore held that courts of
the member states may treat a failure to apply EU competition
law in the arbitral award as a violation of public policy within
the meaning of the New York Convention.157  Following the
Eco Swiss decision, a national court of an EU member state,
when approached with an application for annulment of an ar-
bitral award, must grant that application if it considers the
award to be contrary to EU competition law.
At the national level, courts of EU member states have
also recognized the arbitrability of antitrust law.  In France, for
example, the arbitrability of antitrust issues was recognized in
the decision of the Court of Appeal of Paris of 1993.158  Under
English law, antitrust issues are arbitrable “as far as the effect
of competition law on the rights of the parties themselves are
concerned.”159  Private aspects of competition law can also be
pean Union. Id.  There was no block exemption available and the parties
did not notify their agreement to the European Commission, thus depriving
it of a chance to receive individual exemption. Id. ¶ 21.
154. Id. ¶ 14.
155. Id. ¶ 35 (“It is in the interest of efficient arbitration proceedings that
review of arbitration awards should be limited in scope and that annulment
of or refusal to recognise an award should be possible only in exceptional
circumstances.”).
156. Id. ¶ 36.
157. Id. ¶ 41 (“[A] national court to which application is made for annul-
ment of an arbitration award must grant that application if it considers that
the award in question is in fact contrary to Article 85 of the Treaty, where its
domestic rules of procedure require it to grant an application for annulment
founded on failure to observe national rules of public policy.”).
158. See Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, 1e ch., May
19, 1993, 1993 REVUE DE L’ARBITRAGE [REV. ARB.] 645, note Jarrosson (Fr.).
159. See ET Plus SA v. Jean-Paul Welter & The Channel Tunnel Group Ltd
[2005] EWHC (Comm) 2115, [50] (Eng.) (“There is no realistic doubt that
such [Arts. 81 and 82] ‘competition’ or ‘anti-trust’ claims are arbitrable; the
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arbitrated under the Dutch law.160  In Sweden, the arbitrability
of competition law claims was established by statute: the 1999
Arbitration Act, which provides that “arbitrators may rule on
the civil law effects of competition law as between the par-
ties.”161  In Lithuania, the arbitration law includes competition
law claims for damages in the realm of commercial disputes
which can be referred to arbitration.162
B. Phase II: Courts Take a Second Look
Once arbitrability was established, antitrust arbitration en-
tered its second phase of development—an increasing reliance
on court review of arbitral awards on public policy grounds.
The standards of such review differ and are largely still being
developed in various jurisdictions.
The right of courts to review arbitral awards as to their
application of antitrust law is commonly tracked back to the
Mitsubishi decision, where, relying on the public policy defense
of the New York Convention, the U.S. Supreme Court reserved
for U.S. courts the right to have a second look at the award at
the enforcement stage.163  This became known as the “second
look” doctrine, which has received its share of criticism from
arbitration practitioners and academics and led some com-
mentators to suggest that Mitsubishi opened the door for sub-
stantive review of arbitral awards addressing statutory
issue is whether they come within the scope of the arbitration clause, as a
matter of its true construction.”).
160. See LANDOLT, supra note 24, ¶ 5–19 (“Under Dutch law there has R
been little hesitation in accepting that the parties are able to settle the pri-
vate aspects of competition matters themselves, and that therefore these as-
pects are arbitrable.”).
161. 1 § SWEDISH ARBITRATION ACT (SFS 1999:116) (Swed.) available at
http://www.sccinstitute.com/the-swedish-arbitration-act-sfs-1999121.aspx.
162. See Law on Commercial Arbitration of the Republic of Lithuania, 2
April 1996, No. I-1274 (New wording of the Law from June 30, 2012, No. XI-
2089, June 21, 2012, Official Gazette Valstybes _inios, 2012, No. 76-3932 (June
30, 2012) (unofficial translation), available at http://www.lawin.com/en/
publications/reviews/lawin-publishes-english-translation-of-the-new-law-on-
commercial-arbitration-of-the-republic-of-lithuania/.
163. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler-Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 638 (1985) (“Having permitted the arbitration to go forward, the na-
tional courts of the United States will have the opportunity at the award-
enforcement stage to ensure that the legitimate interest in the enforcement
of the antitrust laws has been addressed.”).
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claims.164  However, Born points out that it is unclear
“whether a court in the U.S. will have a chance to look at such
an award” rendered in international arbitration.165  Indeed,
U.S. courts might not have an opportunity to review an award
if both the annulment and enforcement are sought solely
outside of the United States.
It is uncertain which standard of review is required by the
“second look” doctrine—a broad examination of the arbitral
award or only a quick look at whether the arbitrator in fact
considered antitrust law.166  The U.S. Supreme Court only ob-
served in this respect that “[w]hile the efficacy of the arbitral
process requires that substantive review at the award-enforce-
ment stage remain minimal, it would not require intrusive in-
quiry to ascertain that the tribunal took cognizance of the anti-
trust claims and actually decided them.”167  As Park rightly
points out, the doctrine appears problematic in either case,
since “[i]f it calls for review on the merits, it disrupts the arbi-
tral process.  But if it calls only for a mechanical examination
of the face of the award, it may not provide an effective check
on an arbitrator who mentions the Sherman Act before he
proceeds to ignore it.”168  However, the “second look” doc-
trine can be reconciled with pro-arbitration bias and limited
review of arbitral awards under the U.S. law if, as Landolt be-
164. The suggestions are based on the reading of the U.S. Supreme
Court’s decision in Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. 614, where the Court held that
“[w]hile the efficacy of the arbitral process requires that substantive review at
the award-enforcement stage remain minimal, it would not require intrusive
inquiry to ascertain that the tribunal took cognizance of the antitrust claims
and actually decided them” (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Id. at 638.
For criticism of the “second look” doctrine, see generally Gordon Blanke,
The “Minimalist” and “Maximalist” Approach to Reviewing Competition Law
Awards: A Never-Ending Saga Revisited or the Middle Way at Last, in POST-HEAR-
ING ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 196 (Devin Bray & Heather L.
Bray eds. 2013).
165. 1 BORN, supra note 18, at 797. R
166. Radicati Di Brozolo, Antitrust, supra note 36, at 24. See also Landolt, R
Arbitration and Antitrust, supra note 85, at 235 (“[T]he suggestion [in Mitsub- R
ishi] is that the reviewing court need only verify that antitrust, where raised,
has been dealt with by the arbitral tribunal, and need not enquire into how
the tribunal dealt with it.”)
167. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 638.
168. PARK, supra note 104, at 217. R
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lieves, it entails nothing else than the usual New York Conven-
tion public policy scrutiny.169
Surprisingly, to date there are only a handful of cases in
the United States that have invoked Mitsubishi and its “second
look” doctrine to complain of tribunal’s application of
mandatory law and challenge the arbitral award on public pol-
icy grounds.170  One of the rare examples is provided in Baxter
v. Abbott Laboratories,171 where the Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit, relying on Mitsubishi, declined to take a “second
look” at the treatment of antitrust law, since the arbitrators
had already dealt with it in arbitration.172  The court in Baxter
also stressed that a mistake in the application of antitrust law is
not a ground for setting aside.173
By contrast, in Europe, there is a continuous flow of cases
from various jurisdictions seeking to develop a proper stan-
dard of review of antitrust-related arbitral awards in setting
aside and enforcement proceedings.  Even prior to Eco Swiss,
the Supreme Court of Slovenia—then not yet an EU member
state—set aside an arbitral award rendered in Yugoslavia on
the grounds that the contract at issue created “if not a monop-
oly, at least a privileged situation” and as such violated compe-
tition law and therefore the public policy of Slovenia.174
More recently, the courts in Europe have been busy seek-
ing to ensure that EU competition law has been properly ad-
dressed in arbitral awards.175  In doing so, the court have em-
169. LANDOLT, supra note 24, ¶ 5–22. R
170. Donovan & Greenawalt, supra note 13, at 38 (“In the two decades R
since Mitsubishi, it appears that U.S. courts have decided only a single case in
which a party has complained about an international tribunal’s application
of a statutory claim implicating a U.S. mandatory law.”).
171. Baxter Intern., Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, 315 F.3d 829 (7th Cir.
2003).
172. Id. at 832.
173. Id. at 831 (“But the initial question is whether Baxter is entitled to
reargue an issue that was resolved by the arbitral tribunal. We think not; a
mistake of law is not a ground on which to set aside an award.”).
174. Kajo-Erzeugnisse Essenzen GmbH v. DO Zdravilisce Radenska, Oberster
Gerichtshof, 20 October 1993 and 23 February 1998, 24 Y.B. COMM. ARB.
919, 919 (1999) (Austria).
175. The issue of ensuring compatibility of international arbitral awards
with EU competition law has been recently discussed in the Genentech case
pending with the ECJ, where the Advocate General has expressed his opin-
ion that it is for the courts, and not the arbitral tribunals, to ensure compati-
bility of the award with EU law. See Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet,
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ployed a surprisingly divergent standards of review of arbitral
awards in setting aside and recognition and enforcement pro-
ceedings.  The principal cases discussed below have revived in
court analysis and academic discussion a familiar battle be-
tween the “maximalist” and “minimalist” approaches to court
review of arbitral awards.176  The maximalist approach calls for
the full-fledged review of arbitral awards on the merits, and
was famously followed by the Dutch courts in the Marketing Dis-
plays International case177.  This case involved an application for
enforcement in the Netherlands of three arbitral awards is-
sued in an arbitration in the United States.  The arbitration
resulted from a dispute regarding royalties and a violation of
the exclusivity provision in a patent, trademark, and know-how
license agreement between a U.S. company, Marketing Dis-
plays International, Inc. (MDI), and a Dutch company, Van
Raalte Reclame B.V. (Van Raalte).  The agreement provided
for the application of the law of the state of Michigan and the
law of the United States, with all disputes to be resolved by
arbitration under the rules of American Arbitration Associa-
tion (AAA).178  Having won the arbitration, MDI applied for
enforcement in the Netherlands, where the Hague Court of
First Instance refused to enforce the award, finding the agree-
Genentech Inc. v. Hoechst GmbH, formerly Hoechst AG, Sanofi-Aventis
Deutschland GmbH, Case C-567/14, EU:C:2016:177, para. 61 (delivered
Mar. 17, 2016) (judgment not yet issued) (“The task of arbitrators in inter-
national commercial arbitration is to interpret and apply the contract bind-
ing the parties correctly.  In the performance of this task, arbitrators may
naturally find it necessary to apply EU law, if it forms part of the law applica-
ble to the contract (lex contractus) or the law applicable to the arbitration (lex
arbitri).  However, the responsibility for reviewing compliance with European
public policy rules lies with the courts of the Member States and not with
arbitrators, whether in the context of an action for annulment or proceed-
ings for recognition and enforcement.” (footnote omitted)).
176. See, e.g., Radicati Di Brozolo, Arbitration and Competition Law, supra
note 95, at 4–8 (reviewing maximalist and minimalist approaches in the R
court review of antitrust-related arbitral awards). See also Gordon Blanke,
The “Minimalist” and “Maximalist” Approach to Reviewing Competition Law
Awards: A Never-Ending Saga Revisited or the Middle Way at Last, in POST-HEAR-
ING ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 169 (Devin Bray & Heather L.
Bray eds. 2013) (discussing whether the “Middle Way” is the best way for-
ward in the review of EU competition law awards).
177. See MDI v. Van Raalte (decision of 24 March 2005), supra note 10, at R
808.
178. Id. at 808–09.
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ment to be in breach of now Article 101(1) of the TFEU, and
not eligible for an exemption under Article 101(3).179  The
issue of the EU competition law violation was never raised in
the arbitration.180  MDI then appealed to the Court of Appeal
of The Hague, which confirmed the lower court’s decision to
refuse enforcement.181  In doing so, the Court of Appeal in-
voked the Eco Swiss judgment, pointing to the public policy
nature of EU competition law as a ground for challenge.182  It
then conducted an in-depth analysis of the license agreement
for its compliance with EU competition law.  The court found
it to be prima facie anti-competitive and not eligible for an ex-
emption.183  The Court of Appeal thus performed a full review
on the merits in the enforcement proceeding, which raised
alarms in the international arbitration community, fearful that
arbitral awards were losing their finality because of EU compe-
tition law implications.184
Different standards of review were applied by the French
and Belgian courts with respect to the same award in what be-
came known as the SNF/Cytec saga.185  The dispute in that case
179. Id. at 815.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 819.
182. Id. at 814–15.
183. Id. at 815–19.
184. See, e.g., Assimakis Komninos, Dutch Court Refuses to Enforce US Arbitral
Awards on Public Policy Grounds for Violation of EU Competition Law, 19 INT’L
DISPUTE RESOL. 5, 7 (2006) (“The judgment of the Court of Appeal of The
Hague is a disappointing development for international arbitration in Eu-
rope.”). See also Mourre & Radicati Di Brozolo, supra note 20, at 182 (“[T]he R
judgment . . . is in contrast with mainstream thinking and case law, accord-
ing to which . . . court control over awards should be limited to exceptional
circumstances, where there is a manifest disregard of a fundamental princi-
ple, or where the contract entered into by the parties amounted to fraud.
Where competition law comes into play, such a manifest and flagrant viola-
tion would occur, for instance, in the presence of a hardcore price-fixing or
market-partitioning cartel.”).
185. See Pierre Heitzmann & Jacob Grierson, SNF v. Cytec Industrie: National
Courts within the EC Apply Different Standards to Review International Awards Al-
legedly Contrary to Article 81 EC, 2 STOCKHOLM INT’L ARB. REV. 39 (2007) (ana-
lyzing the facts of the case and the resultant court proceedings and arguing
that the courts should not review awards on the merits just because there are
allegations of international public policy violation). See also Alexis Mourre,
Courts in France and Belgium Confirm Limited Review of Awards under European
Competition Law, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Feb. 7, 2010), http://kluwerarbitration-
blog.com/blog/2010/02/07/courts-in-france-and-belgium-confirm-limited-
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led to the ICC arbitration in Brussels with the tribunal issuing
a partial award on liability in 2002 and then a final award on
damages and interest in 2004.  In its partial award, the tribunal
found the long-term contract for the supply of a chemical
compound between Cytec Industries BV (Cytec, a Dutch sup-
plier) and SNF SAS SA (SNF, a French buyer) to be contrary
to present Article 101 of the TFEU.  Both parties were found
equally liable, as they knew or should have known that their
contract was null.186  The parties were to compensate each
other for half of any damages suffered as a result of such nul-
lity.  Under the final award, however, the tribunal awarded
damages only to Cytec, as SNF was not able to prove that it
could have obtained a better deal from other supplier, and
thus was unable to substantiate its damages.187  Following the
arbitration, Cytec filed for enforcement of the final award in
France.  SNF then sought to set aside the awards in
Belgium.188
In the enforcement proceeding, SNF attempted to chal-
lenge the award, arguing violations of Articles 101 and 102 of
the TFEU.189  The Paris Court of Appeal granted enforce-
ment, employing the minimalist approach in its review of the
award.190  The Court explained that it exercises “only an ex-
trinsic review of the award since only the recognition or en-
forcement of the award is reviewed with respect to its compli-
ance with international public policy at the time of its submis-
sion to the judge.”191  Reiterating its wording in Thale`s,192 the
review-of-awards-under-european-competition-law (reviewing the SNF v. Cytec
saga and arguing that the courts in their review of arbitral awards should
seek to strike a balance between finality of the awards and protection of
public interest of free competition in the markets).
186. Heitzmann & Grierson, supra note 185, at 41. R
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. (“SNF challenged the enforcement proceedings before the
French courts on a number of grounds, including that the agreement vio-
lated Articles 81 and 82 EC by awarding the allegedly dominant party, Cytec,
more benefits through the annulment of the 1993 Contract than through it
performance.”).
190. See Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, 1e ch., Mar.
23, 2006, 32 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 282 (2007) (Fr.).
191. For an English translation of the decision, see Heitzmann & Grier-
son, supra note 185. R
192. See Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, 1e ch., Nov.
18, 2004, 2004 REVUE DE L’ARBITRAGE [REV. ARB.] 986 (Fr.).
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Court held that there has to be a “flagrant, real and concrete
violation of international public policy” to warrant the chal-
lenge of an award.193  It therefore granted enforcement, hav-
ing verified that the tribunal had “addressed the issue of
whether the . . . contract complies with the provisions of [Arti-
cles 101 and 102 of the TFEU], with respect to the facts and
the legal instruments which were presented by the parties, as
well as with respect to the case-law of the ECJ.”194  The Court
of Cassation confirmed the Court of Appeal’s decision.195
In Belgium, the awards were first annulled by the Court of
First Instance of Brussels, which reviewed the reasoning of the
arbitral tribunal with respect to present Articles 101 and 102 of
the TFEU, but chose not to examine the underlying evi-
dence.196  The decision of the Court of First Instance was met
with slight confusion, considering its contrast with the French
courts’ judgments regarding the proper standard of review of
arbitral awards.197  It appeared that the Brussels court sought
to invoke a more substantial review than the minimalist ap-
proach of the French courts, but its review was still more lim-
ited than that employed by the Dutch courts in the Marketing
Displays International case.  The Brussels court’s approach was
welcomed by some commentators as offering a “middle way”
between maximalist and minimalist positions in the court re-
193. See Heitzmann & Grierson, supra note 185, at 42 (offering an English R
translation of Belgian and French cases).
194. Id. at 47.
195. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [Supreme Court for Judicial Matters] 1e
civ., June 4, 2008, 2008 REVUE DE L’ARBITRAGE [REV. ARB.] 473, note I. Fadlal-
lah (Fr.).
196. See Tribunal de Premie`re Instance [Civ.] [Tribunal of First Instance]
Bruxelles, March 8, 2007, 2007 REVUE DE L’ARBITRAGE [REV. ARB.] 303
(Belg.). See also Heitzmann & Grierson, supra note 185, at 46–47 (quoting R
the Court as holding that it is “not for this court to rehear the merits of the
case which was submitted to arbitration but rather to verify, by reading the
award, whether . . . [t]he Tribunal has or has not breached Articles 81 and
82 of the EC Treaty, which are [rules of public policy]”).
197. See Heitzmann & Grierson, supra note 185, at 47 (“While the . . . R
judgment [of the Court of First Instance of Brussels] does appear to be more
closely in line with the views of those practitioners who favour a more sub-
stantial review of international awards on antitrust issues, it goes beyond
what most practitioners would expect: the [Court] . . . effectively reviewed
the allocation of damages as a result of a contract held contrary to Article 81
EC.”).
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view of antitrust-related arbitral awards.198  Yet, to the relief of
most arbitration lawyers, this decision was later reversed by the
Brussels Court of Appeal.199  The Court of Appeal concluded
that SNF was seeking to revisit the tribunal’s decision in order
to address the prejudice it faced from the nullity of the con-
tract, which, according to the Court of Appeal, does not raise
an issue of public policy.200
The standard of review was also addressed in several cases
in Germany, such as the 2004 decision of the Court of Appeal
of Du¨sseldorf in the enforcement proceedings that raised the
issue of compatibility of an arbitral award rendered in Zurich
to EU competition law.201  The court in this case performed an
in-depth analysis of the award, which encompassed “an exten-
sive examination of the evidence, including the hearing of wit-
nesses,” followed by a “detailed and wide-ranging examination
of the legal aspects of the case.”202  By contrast, the Court of
Appeal of Thu¨ringen, which looked at the enforcement re-
quest of the Swiss arbitration award in 2007, relied on “a sum-
mary plausibility review” of the award in its assessment of
whether the tribunal had properly addressed EU and German
competition law.203  The courts in other EU jurisdictions, such
as Italy and Sweden, have similarly stated that the review of
arbitral awards as to their application of EU competition law
has to be limited.204
198. See, e.g., Gordon Blanke, The “Minimalist” and “Maximalist” Approach to
Reviewing Competition Law Awards: A Never-Ending Saga Revisted or the Middle
Way at Last, in POST-HEARING ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 169, 169
(Devin Bray & Heather L. Bray eds., 2013).
199. See Cours d’Appel [Court of Appeal] Bruxelles, 17e ch. June 22,
2009, 2009 REVUE DE L’ARBITRAGE [REV. ARB.] 574, note Mourre.
200. See JAN PAULSSON, THE IDEA OF ARBITRATION 142 (2013) (quoting the
Brussels Court of Appeal as “[SNF] was pursuing a complete revision of the
arbitral awards in order to open the door for a different assessment of the
prejudice flowing from the nullity of a contract, which does not raise an
issue of ordre public”).
201. See Landolt, Arbitration and Antitrust, supra note 85, at 236–37 (refer- R
ring to Oberlandesgericht Du¨sseldorf [OLG] [Du¨sseldorf Court of Appeals]
July 21, 2004, VI-Sch (Kart) 1/02 (Ger.)).
202. Id.
203. Id. at 237 (referring to Oberlandesgericht Thu¨ringen [OLG] [Thu¨r-
ingen Court of Appeals] Aug. 8, 2007, A.G. Co v. Sch. AG, VI Sch (Kart) 01/
02, OLGR Jena 2008, 162–64 (Ger.)).
204. See Mourre, supra note 185 (“In Italy, both the court of appeal of R
Milan in Tensacciai (8 March 2006) and Florence (Nuovo Pignone, 21
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Interestingly, despite the decisions of the ECJ and the na-
tional courts of the member states regarding the public policy
nature of EU competition law, Swiss courts have held that such
law—although important for the proper functioning of the
Common market—does not constitute public policy.205  As a
result, an arbitral award is unlikely to be set aside or refused
enforcement in Switzerland on the ground that it violates EU
competition law (and therefore public policy within the mean-
ing of the New York Convention).
C. Phase III: You Can Do It, Arbitral Tribunals!
Although the majority of the second phase cases deal with
the standard of review of arbitral awards, they also inform us
about the arbitrator’s obligation to apply antitrust law.206
Where the parties are silent in arbitration regarding the anti-
trust implications of their contract or conduct, the arbitrator
may also have to raise antitrust issues sua sponte or, using a con-
cept more familiar to European lawyers, ex officio (by virtue of
one’s position).  As I argue in this Article, the focus of the re-
cent cases is gradually shifting to the arbitrator’s obligation
with respect to antitrust law.  This marks a new, third phase in
March 2006) clearly stated that the scrutiny should be limited to verifying
that the arbitrators duly considered the competition law issues and held that
a misapplication of such rules is not tantamount to a violation of interna-
tional public policy.  In Sweden, the Svea court of appeal held in 2005 (Rep.
of Latvia v. Latvijas Gaze) that the concept of public policy should be given a
narrow application in the context of the review of an arbitral award and that
a violation of competition law can only lead to an annulment in ‘obvious
cases.’”).
205. Tribunal Fe´de´ral [TF] [Federal Supreme Court] Mar. 8, 2006, 2006
REVUE DE L’ARBITRAGE [REV. ARB.] 763 (Switz.). See also David P. Roney, Swit-
zerland: Swiss Federal Supreme Court Holds Competition Law is Not Part of Public
Policy, 9 INT. A.L.R. 49, 51 (2006) (“The Swiss Federal Supreme Court thus
concluded that provisions of competition law, whether Swiss, European or
other, do not form part of the essential and widely recognized values which,
according to conceptions prevailing in Switzerland, should constitute the
foundation of any legal system.”).
206. See Radicati Di Brozolo, Antitrust, supra note 36, at 25 (“[T]he central R
problem of the relations between competition law and arbitration is unques-
tionably that of the powers of national judges in respect of the control of
awards raising antitrust issues, both in setting-aside and in enforcement pro-
ceedings.  The debate is crucial also for the purposes of identifying the ‘obli-
gations’ of arbitrators regarding the application of competition law.”).
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the development of antitrust arbitration, where tribunals are
trusted with the antitrust enforcement.
The discussion of the arbitrator’s obligation to apply anti-
trust law is not new.  The question was famously raised by the
Dutch court in Eco Swiss in its reference for a preliminary rul-
ing.207  The ECJ did not answer the question directly.  Yet, it is
commonly believed that Eco Swiss created such an obligation—
at least under EU law with respect to EU competition law—by
holding that a national court has the right to annul an award
violating EU competition law on public policy grounds.208
The arbitrator’s ex officio obligation was also addressed in
the famous Thale`s decision, where the Paris Court of Appeal
held that the mere fact that the arbitrator failed to raise EU
competition law ex officio did not warrant setting aside of the
award.209  In light of the Thale`s decision, some commentators
argued that there was “no such thing as the implied ex officio
duty on the part of the international arbitrator to take into
account mandatory European law issues, including more spe-
cifically, European Community (EC) competition law, in order
to render an enforceable award.”210  By contrast, other com-
mentators firmly believe that the Thale`s decision “seeks to lay
down a standard for the breach of the arbitrator’s ex officio
207. Case C-126/97, Eco Swiss China Time Ltd v. Benetton Int’l, 1999
E.C.R. I-3055, ¶ 30 (asking to what extent the ECJ’s earlier decisions on the
right of courts to raise EU competition law claims of their own motion apply
by analogy in private arbitration where the parties make no reference to the
provisions of EC competition law and under applicable rules of procedure
arbitrators are not at liberty to raise such claims on their own motion).
208. Id. ¶ 41.  See also Landolt, Arbitration and Antitrust, supra note 85, at R
239 (“Eco Swiss . . . results in a duty under EU law for arbitrators to apply EU
competition law.”).
209. See Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, 1e ch, Nov.
18, 2004, 2004 REVUE DE L’ARBITRAGE [REV. ARB.] 986.  See also Mourre &
Radicati Di Brozolo, supra note 20, at 177 n.35 (quoting the Thale`s decision R
as holding that “the sole fact that antitrust law was not raised ex officio by
the arbitral tribunal does not justify the setting aside of the award”).
210. Gordon Blanke, Defining the Limits of Scrutiny of Awards Based on Alleged
Violations of European Competition Law: A Re´plique to Denis Bensaude’s “Thale`s Air
Defence BV v. GIE Euromissile,” 23 J. INT’L ARB. 249, 249 (2006) (paraphrasing
the arguments of Denis Bensaude, former counsel of the International
Chamber of Commerce Court of Arbitration).  Blanke ultimately disagrees
with the Bensaude’s interpretation of Thale`s as to the existence of the arbi-
trator’s duty to raise antitrust concerns ex officio. Id.
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duty.”211  The Thale`s decision is further cited for the proposi-
tion that the arbitrator’s ex officio obligation to apply antitrust
law is not absolute, and the award will not be annulled or re-
fused enforcement where, as Blanke suggests, “competition
law issues concerned were so intricate that they could not be
readily detected by the arbitrator at the time of rendering the
award in question.”212
Challenges of arbitral awards in setting aside and recogni-
tion and enforcement proceedings also increasingly allege
breach of antitrust law by the arbitrator himself—in particular,
by the alleged misapplication of antitrust law, failure to raise
and apply antitrust claims in arbitration on tribunal’s own mo-
tion, or violation of antitrust law provisions by the award it-
self.213
For instance, Baxter International, Inc. (a licensor and an
award debtor) argued in the annulment proceeding that the
tribunal itself violated U.S. antitrust law by constructing the
exclusivity requirement of the license agreement to prohibit
Baxter to compete with its own licensee, Abbott.214  In arbitra-
tion, Baxter alleged that it was not bound by the exclusivity
requirement and that if the license indeed prohibited it from
competing with the licensee, the license would be in violation
of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.  Seeking to annul the award,
it then argued in court that the tribunal’s construction of the
license agreement, as presented in the award, violated U.S. an-
211. Id. at 250 (“[A]n arbitrator . . . remains obliged to review the case he
is dealing with for potential EC competition law issues and raise these of his
own motion in the event that neither of the parties has done so in their
respective submissions to the arbitral tribunal.” (citation omitted)).
212. Id.  Note that in Thale`s, during the ICC arbitration neither the legal
representatives of the parties, nor the ICC legal counsel, nor the tribunal
itself recognized competition law issues in question.  And so, as Blanke ex-
plains, the Paris Court of Appeal did not consider the public policy violation
to be blatant enough to warrant setting aside of the award on the public
policy ground for the arbitrator’s failure to raise and apply competition law
issues. Id. at 256.
213. See Heitzmann & Grierson, supra note 185, at 42 (referring to the R
SNF/Cytec saga and the SNF’s setting aside application in Belgium alleging
the breach of EC competition law by the tribunal).
214. Baxter Intern, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, 315 F.3d 829, 832 (7th Cir.
2003) (“According to Baxter, there is a difference between arbitrating an
antitrust issue (the subject of Mitsubishi) and creating one-which it accuses
these arbitrators of doing.  If the tribunal had construed the Baxter-Maruishi
agreement differently, there would have been no antitrust problem.”).
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titrust law.  Relying on Mitsubishi, however, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit categorically refused review on
the merits of the parties’ dispute, pointing out that mistake of
law does not constitute a ground for setting aside.215
A similar argument was made in the Genentech case, which
is now before the ECJ for a preliminary ruling from the Court
of Appeal of Paris.216  In this case, Genentech (a U.S. biotech-
nology corporation now owned by Swiss Roche) reportedly ar-
gued in setting aside proceeding that the sole arbitrator in the
ICC arbitration in Paris violated EU competition law by find-
ing Genentech liable for royalties and awarding damages to
Hoechst (a German affiliate of Sanofi) without first determin-
ing whether Genentech infringed the patents at issue.217  At
the center of the dispute is a licensing agreement218 governed
by German law, which provides for the payment of royalties by
Genentech (the licensee) for the use of rights covered by pat-
ents issued to Hoechst (the licensor).  In arbitration, Hoechst
argued that Genentech had not been paying royalties with re-
spect to two drugs allegedly developed with the use of pat-
ented technology—Rituxan and Avastin, the former being the
top selling drug of Roche, with annual sales of over C= 5 bil-
lion.219  There are three patents involved: a European patent
215. Id. at 831 (“Under domestic law, as well as under the Convention,
arbitrators ‘have completely free rein to decide the law as well as the facts
and are not subject to appellate review.’” (citation omitted)).
216. Request for a preliminary ruling from the Cour d’appel de Paris
(France), lodged on 9 December 2014, Genentech Inc. v Hoechst GmbH,
formerly Hoechst AG, Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GmbH (Case C-567/14),
2015 O.J. (C73) 12.
217. For the reported facts of the case, see Lacey Yong, Paris Court Turns to
ECJ in Set–Aside Case, GLOBAL ARB. REV. (Oct. 6, 2014), http://globalarbitra
tionreview.com/news/article/33034/paris-court-turns-ecj-set-aside-case/.
218. According to the facts of the related litigation in the United States,
under the agreement Genentech was to pay “a running royalty of 0.5% on
the sale of commercially marketable goods incorporating a ‘Licensed Prod-
uct’”.  Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GmbH v. Genentech, Inc., 716 F.3d 586,
589.  The agreement further defined licensed products as “materials (includ-
ing organisms), the manufacture, use or sale of which would, in the absence
of this Agreement, infringe one or more unexpired issued claims of the Li-
censed Patent Rights.” Id.
219. See Pierre Ve´ron & Amandine Me´tier, FR - Genentech v. Hoechst and
Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland / Referral CJEU, EPLAW PATENT BLOG (Oct. 17,
2014), http://www.eplawpatentblog.com/eplaw/2014/10/fr-genentech-v-
hoechst-and-sanofi-aventis-deutschland-referral-cjeu.html.
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revoked for lack of novelty,220 and two U.S. patents found not
to have been infringed by Genentech in related U.S. patent
litigation.221  Despite the U.S. court decisions, the sole arbitra-
tor found Genentech liable for the breach of the licensing
agreement and awarded Hoechst over 100 million Euro in
damages and over 50 million Euro in interest.  In the setting
aside proceeding, Genentech contends that the requirement
to pay royalties in case of invalidity/non-infringement of pat-
ents (as provided for by the arbitral award) distorts competi-
tion on the market in violation of Article 101 of the TFEU.  It
thus argues that pursuant to Article 1520 of the French Code
of Civil Procedure222 the award has to set aside in France, as it
violates EU competition law and is therefore contrary to inter-
national public policy.223  In its preliminary ruling request, the
Court of Appeal of Paris has asked the ECJ whether provisions
of EU competition law must be interpreted as precluding to
giving effect, in case of revocation of the patents, to a license
agreement which requires the licensee to pay royalties “for the
sole use of the rights attached to the licensed patent.”224
With the preliminary ruling request currently pending,
one might think that the Court of Appeal of Paris in Genentech
does not trust the tribunal and therefore conducts a more
thorough analysis of the award than its usual minimalist re-
view.  However, considering the strong pro-arbitration bias of
French law and prior decisions of the Court of Appeal of Paris,
this seems unlikely.  The preliminary ruling request does not
mention the award, arbitration, or the arbitrator’s obligation
to apply EU competition law.  Instead, the Court appears to be
concerned with the substantive provisions of EU competition
law and the ECJ’s interpretation thereof to conduct its own
220. See Pierre Ve´ron, Is Paying for a Licensed but Later Invalidated Patent
Contrary to Article 101 of the TFEU? KLUWER PATENT BLOG (Oct. 18, 2014),
http://kluwerpatentblog.com/2014/10/18/is-paying-for-a-licensed-but-later
-invalidated-patent-contrary-to-article101-of-the-tfeu/ (describing the facts of
the case and its procedural history).
221. See Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GmbH v. Genentech, Inc., Nos. C
08–4909 SI, C 09–4919 SI, 2011 WL 839411 (N.D. Cal. 2011), aff’d, 473
Fed.Appx. 885 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
222. Code de Proce´dure Civile [C.P.C.] [Civil Procedure Code] art. 1520
(Fr.).
223. Yong, supra note 217. R
224. Request for a preliminary ruling from the Cour d’appel de Paris
(France), lodged on 9 December 2014, supra note 216. R
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analysis of the international public policy violation.  It needs
such interpretation to assess whether a “flagrant, effective and
concrete” violation of international public policy took
place.225  If the ECJ indicates that there is a violation of EU
competition law, going forward the Court of Appeal will be
able to screen out international public policy violations and
grant annulment of arbitral awards in similar cases.  For the
Genentech case itself, however, the alleged violation is hardly
“flagrant”—which would require annulment of the award—
since even the Court of Appeal is uncertain, and therefore has
referred the question to the ECJ.226
Taken together, the above cases clearly suggest that courts
across jurisdictions will not review arbitral awards because of
their antitrust implications unless neither the parties nor the
tribunal on its own motion have raised antitrust claims in arbi-
tration (see decisions in MDI and Thale`s).  Where the courts
do allow the challenge to go forward in setting aside (Baxter,
Thale`s, SNF/Cytec in Belgian courts) or enforcement proceed-
ings (MDI, SNF/Cytec in French courts), they usually do not re-
view awards on the merits (with the exception of MDI) and
would not set aside or refuse enforcement on public policy
grounds unless the violation is extremely serious (e.g., meeting
the “flagrant, effective and concrete” standard of Thale`s).  Fi-
nally, the court would not allow setting aside even where the
tribunal has made a mistake in the application of antitrust law
(see Baxter).
225. See also Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, 1e ch.
(section C), Nov. 18, 2004, 2004 REVUE DE L’ARBITRAGE [REV. ARB.] 986 (Fr.).
226. Note that in his Opinion in the Genentech case Advocate General
Wathelet has expressed concerns over the flagrant infringement standard
used by French law. See Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet, supra note
175, para. 58 (“In my opinion, limitations on the scope of the review of inter- R
national arbitral awards such as those under French law mentioned by
Hoechst and Sanofi-Aventis as well as by the French Government—namely
the flagrant nature of the infringement of international public policy and
the impossibility of reviewing an international arbitral award on the ground
of such an infringement where the question of public policy was raised and
debated before the arbitral tribunal—are contrary to the principle of effec-
tiveness of EU law.”).  Therefore, it particularly interesting to see how the
ECJ in the Genentech case will address the issue of review of international
arbitral awards for compatibility with EU law in light of the European public
policy considerations.
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This does not mean, however, that the arbitrator has no
duty to apply antitrust law in international arbitration.  On the
contrary, applying antitrust law, as well as raising antitrust is-
sues sua sponte, has become mandatory for any arbitrator seek-
ing to render an enforceable award.  Failure to do so would
make an award susceptible to challenges on public policy
grounds in setting aside and enforcement proceedings.  Rais-
ing antitrust concerns and applying antitrust law, albeit with
mistakes of law, would, on the other hand, most probably
shield the award from subsequent challenge in the absence of
a severe public policy violation.
IV. INSIDE THE ARBITRAL PROCEEDINGS: THE ROLE OF
ARBITRAL TRIBUNALS
As the discussed cases and awards demonstrate, arbitral
tribunals across jurisdictions are increasingly being pushed by
courts towards application of antitrust law.  Yet, strictly speak-
ing, there is no legal duty on an arbitrator to apply mandatory
law.  Not a single legal act provides for the liability of an arbi-
trator for failure to apply mandatory law.  What, then, is the
nature of the arbitrator’s obligation to raise and apply anti-
trust law?  And how can arbitrators be incentivized to enforce
antitrust law without compromising the central features of in-
ternational arbitration (the finality of arbitral awards, and the
neutrality, impartiality and independence of arbitral tribu-
nals)?  This Part seeks to answer these questions.
A. Beyond the Parties’ Intent: Arbitrator’s Obligation to Apply
Antitrust Law
Given the advantages of international arbitration, parties
entering into an arbitration agreement often believe in the
contractual nature of their arrangement, that can be “custom
tailored”227 to fit the needs of a particular dispute.  This in-
cludes the ability to choose the law to govern the arbitration
agreement, the arbitration, and the merits of the dispute, as
well as to appoint international arbitrators with the skills and
experience to settle the dispute as instructed by applicable
laws and arbitration rules.  In return, arbitrators are expected
227. See Baker & Stabile, supra note 20, at 414. R
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to perform their duties with a view to produce an enforceable
arbitral award.228
Yet, to the surprise of the parties, arbitrators often apply
mandatory law in international arbitration.229  This is the case
even though the role of the arbitrator in the application of
mandatory law varies across jurisdictions and commentators
disagree whether the arbitrator has an obligation to apply
mandatory law.  Proponents of the private nature of interna-
tional arbitration have observed that it is not the role of arbi-
tral tribunals to protect public interest.  Unlike courts, arbitral
tribunals are not the organs of the state.230  They also argue
that the arbitrator in international arbitration should have no
particular state interests to protect, as first and foremost he
owes his duty to the parties, and not to any legal order
mandatory laws of which he may be relied upon to enforce.231
Moreover, by respecting mandatory law provisions (for in-
stance, of the place of contract performance) and thus ignor-
ing the choice of law made by the parties, the arbitrator risks
the enforceability of arbitral award, as he may exceed jurisdic-
tion “under the law of a country called to enforce the award or
monitor the integrity of the process.”232  By contrast, by disre-
garding mandatory law requirements the arbitrator risks that
the award will be set aside or refused enforcement, as such
award may be found to be in violation of the public policy of
the country.  The above dilemma cannot be easily resolved.
228. See International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) Rules of Arbitration,
art. 41 effective Jan. 1, 2012, http://www.iccwbo.org/products-and-services/
arbitration-and-adr/arbitration/icc-rules-of-arbitration (“[T]he arbitral tri-
bunal shall . . . make every effort to make sure that the award is enforceable
at law.”).
229. Mourre & Radicati Di Brozolo, supra note 20, at 171 n.1 (“Arbitrators R
now routinely apply mandatory rules, even ex officio.”).
230. See, e.g., Hans Smit, Mandatory Rules in International Commercial Arbitra-
tion, 18 AM. REV. INT’L. ARB. 155, 155 (2007) (“[i]n the good old days, arbi-
trators did not adjudicate issues of mandatory law.  These were within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the competent public authorities” (footnote omit-
ted)).
231. See Philippe Pinsolle, Private Enforcement of European Community Compe-
tition Rules by Arbitrators, 7 INT’L ARB. L. REV. 14, 22 (2004) (“Arbitrators have
no forum, and they are not the guardians of any legal order. To them, any
legal system is foreign. Their main duties are to apply the law chosen by the
parties and to render an enforceable award.”).
232. Park, supra note 104, at 269. R
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When antitrust issues come into consideration in interna-
tional arbitration, the job of the arbitrator becomes even more
complicated.  First, if the parties instruct the tribunal to apply
a particular governing law in an attempt to get around anti-
trust law requirements of a particular jurisdiction, the tribunal
faces a familiar problem of mandatory law application.  Where
multiple—possibly diverging or even conflicting—mandatory
laws come into the discussion, the arbitrator will have to
choose which mandatory law to apply.  In particular, the duty
to produce an enforceable award may require the tribunal to
apply antitrust law of the jurisdiction(s) where the award is ex-
pected to be enforced.  The latter task is more difficult to
achieve where antitrust laws of relevant jurisdictions take an
opposing view on the antitrust issue at stake.233  Thus, the arbi-
tral tribunal may need to consider the consequences of choos-
ing one antitrust law over another, and the resultant non-ap-
plication of relevant mandatory law in light of particular cir-
cumstances of the case and anticipated places of enforcement.
Second, if the parties specifically instruct the tribunal not
to apply antitrust law, the arbitrators face a much more serious
problem: by following the parties’ instructions they could
themselves violate antitrust law.  At least under EU law, they
could be considered facilitators of restrictive practices and
found personally liable for enforcing an agreement in viola-
tion of EU competition law.234
Third, the parties may not be aware of the antitrust law
implications of their contract or deliberately choose not to ar-
gue antitrust law, leaving the arbitrator in the uncomfortable
233. For instance, U.S. federal antitrust law is no longer treating vertical
minimum resale price maintenance (RPM) as per se illegal, while EU com-
petition law still views such arrangements as hard-core restrictions of compe-
tition prohibited under Article 101 of the TFEU. See EINER ELHAUGE &
DAMIEN GERADIN, GLOBAL COMPETITION LAW AND ECONOMICS 743–44 (2nd
ed. 2011) (“In the United States, vertical minimum price-fixing agreements
were regarded as per se illegal from 1911 until the 2007 decision [Leegin
Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007)] . . . .
Under EU competition law, . . . a vertical agreement providing for resale
price maintenance is deemed such a hard-cored restriction.]”).
234. See Gordon Blanke & Renato Nazzini, Arbitration and ADR of Global
Competition Disputes: Taking Stock (Part II), 48 GLOBAL COMP. LITIG. REV. 87
(2008) (citing Case T-99/04, AC-Treuhand AG v. Comm’n, 2008 E.C.R. II-
1501 to support the claim that arbitrators themselves can be considered in-
struments of anticompetitive conduct).
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position of having to decide whether he can raise such issues
sua sponte without violating his obligations towards the par-
ties.235  The application of antitrust law by arbitral tribunals is
thus surrounded by various uncertainties, which continue to
define international antitrust arbitrations and related court
proceedings.
Yet it is clear that the duty of an arbitrator to render an
enforceable award—which no longer can be achieved without
proper consideration of mandatory laws—also requires the ar-
bitrator to apply antitrust law.  Moreover, it is arguable
whether, by analogy to the court’s obligation to raise illegality
on its own motion,236 arbitrators are also obligated to raise and
apply antitrust law sua sponte, beyond the claims raised by the
parties in international arbitration.237
Far beyond being simply an instrumentality of the private
parties, arbitrators are increasingly invoked in international ar-
bitration to protect public interests.  In antitrust arbitrations,
their role is thus becoming akin to that of courts and public
antitrust authorities.  The expansion of arbitrability to anti-
trust issues comes with a condition for arbitrators—that is en-
suring that antitrust law will be applied in arbitration itself.  As
long as arbitrators adhere to their part of this bargain, courts
are seemingly willing to refrain from excessive interference
into international arbitration by largely relying on minimal re-
view of antitrust-related arbitral awards, such as the quick
235. See Van Houtte, supra note 108, at 66. Note that an arbitrator must R
give the party an opportunity to argue the issue in a post-hearing brief. Oth-
erwise, the award may be set aside on the ground that the losing party was
unable to present its case within the meaning of the New York Convention.
236. See, e.g., Michael Bowsher, Arbitration and Competition, in COMPETITION
LITIGATION IN THE UK 398, 408 (2005) (“In England there seems no particu-
lar reason why the approach of a tribunal should be different from that
taken by a court in a similar situation,” referring to David Birkett v. Acorn
Business Machines Ltd. [1999] 2 All E.R. (Comm) 429).
237. See, e.g., Landolt, Arbitration and Antitrust, supra note 85, at 238 R
(“[w]here a state will annul or refuse to enforce an arbitral award for its
failure to apply antitrust law, in effect that state is placing the arbitral tribu-
nal under a duty to raise antitrust matters of its own motion.  This is because,
although it would be rare for an annulment of an award to have direct per-
sonal consequences for an arbitrator, in practice arbitrators do endeavour to
render enforceable awards.”).
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safety-valve look taken by the Seventh Circuit in Baxter.238  The
balance of this relationship is rather fragile, however, which is
why arbitrators as the biggest proponents of international arbi-
tration should ensure that antitrust law is raised and applied in
international arbitration.
However, it is still unclear how to provide incentives for
international arbitrators to comply with this obligation.  One
solution may be in imposing “arbitrator liability” for failure to
apply antitrust law.239  However, given the current state of in-
ternational arbitration, which combines both jurisdictional
and contractual elements, liability of arbitrators would likely
not be welcomed by arbitrators and other users of interna-
tional arbitration system.  The reasons militating against arbi-
trator liability include interference with the jurisdictional func-
tions of arbitrators (which are viewed as akin to the courts in
this respect), as well as the danger of depriving arbitrators of
their neutrality and impartiality.  Further, once the award is
granted, arbitrator liability would open arbitrators to un-
wanted personal attacks from the award loser seeking to retali-
ate against arbitrators for the outcome of the arbitration.
Another solution was suggested by Hans Smit, who intro-
duced the idea of referring all questions of mandatory law aris-
ing in arbitration to “a single judicial institution of the country
or state whose mandatory law is to be applied.”240  Such a sys-
tem would mirror the preliminary ruling requests available for
the courts in the European Union seeking to acquire interpre-
tation of the EU law from the ECJ.  As suggested, the system
would also ensure consistency through the interpretation of
antitrust law to be applied by arbitral tribunals, as well as the
same judicial institutions being in charge of review of arbitral
awards once they are rendered.241  It is an interesting solution,
but unfortunately unrealistic today.  With respect to the appli-
238. See Baxter Intern., Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, 315 F.3d 829, 832 (7th
Cir. 2003) (“The arbitral tribunal in this case ‘took cognizance of the anti-
trust claims and actually decided them.’  Ensuring this is as far as our review
[of the award] legitimately goes.”).
239. See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman, Arbitrator Liability: Reconciling Arbitration
and Mandatory Law, 49 DUKE L.J. 1279 (2000) (proposing a mechanism of
arbitrator liability, which would allow the losing party in an arbitration to sue
the arbitrator on the ground that a mandatory rule was ignored).
240. Smit, supra note 230, at 170. R
241. Id.
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cation of EU competition law by arbitral tribunals, any request
would have to be referred to the ECJ.  However the ECJ has
already held that arbitral tribunals are not considered to be
tribunals for the purposes of preliminary ruling requests
under Article 267 of the TFEU.242  Thus, certain cooperation
with national courts would be required before a question re-
garding antitrust law to be applied in arbitration could be re-
ferred to the ECJ.  This would necessarily complicate the arbi-
tration process for everyone involved.  Similarly, it is hard to
imagine a single judicial institution that would be willing and
able to pick up all potential requests for the interpretation of
U.S. antitrust law to be applied in international arbitrations
and then also review all awards resulting from such applica-
tion.
Instead, the most effective way to achieve the desired level
of application of antitrust law by arbitrators might be through
the informal norm of shaming.  Most arbitrators are repeat
players in the domain of international arbitration.  It is in their
interest to ensure enforcement of arbitral awards to maintain
their reputation and secure future appointments.  Thus, it is
important to make arbitrators aware of the antitrust issues that
may arise in international arbitration.  In addition, arbitrators
should know that they are increasingly expected to apply anti-
trust law irrespective of the will of the parties, and may have to
do so even on their own motion.  Failure to apply antitrust law
may lead to setting aside or refusing recognition and enforce-
ment of arbitral awards on public policy grounds, thus breach-
ing the arbitrator’s fundamental duty to the parties—to pro-
duce an enforceable award.
B. Observations and Normative Implications
For years following the Supreme Court’s decision in Mit-
subishi, antitrust arbitrations and related court proceedings—
for example, judicial review of the award under the “second
look” right created by Mitsubishi—remained underutilized and
largely unknown for arbitration and antitrust practitioners
alike.  For participants of the arbitration process, including
242. See Case 102/81, Nordsee v. Reederei Mond, 1982 E.C.R. 1095 (find-
ing the link between arbitration procedure and the legal remedies in the
national courts to be insufficiently close to qualify former as a “court or tri-
bunal of the Member State” per Article 177 of the EEC Treaty).
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counsel and arbitral tribunal, the antitrust concerns often ap-
peared to be terra incognita—seemingly outside of the scope of
the contractual dispute, but with a dangerous potential to un-
necessarily complicate arbitral proceedings.  Antitrust issues
were then conveniently ignored.
With the growing reliance on arbitration for resolution of
antitrust disputes, the availability of arbitration agreement cov-
ering antitrust claims is often a matter of chance rather than
deliberate contract drafting aimed to include antitrust claims
into the scope of arbitration agreement.  Additionally, rather
than thinking of arbitration as a forum for private enforce-
ment of antitrust law, parties continue to invoke antitrust
claims primarily as a defense or a counter-claim for breach of
contract claims in international arbitration (using it as a shield
rather than a sword in arbitration).  They seem, however, to be
more antitrust-proactive when they lose in international arbi-
tration and then seek to challenge the award on public policy
grounds in setting aside and enforcement proceedings.
For public authorities entrusted with the enforcement of
U.S. and EU antitrust laws, arbitration has never been a forum
for enforcement work as they primarily rely on administrative
and criminal sanctions, as well as litigation.  Antitrust authori-
ties have gradually come to realize that arbitration can be suc-
cessfully used in the enforcement of antitrust law.  First, the
European Commission began introducing an obligation to ar-
bitrate as part of behavioral commitments in the context of its
merger review.  Now, with the help of domestic courts backed
up by the public policy considerations, the state seems to be
imposing enforcement obligations on the tribunals them-
selves, in effect interfering with the private and contractual na-
ture of international arbitration.
It appears, however, that in the period of nearly thirty
years since Mitsubishi the courts in the U.S. have neither en-
countered a large amount of antitrust arbitration cases, nor
had a chance to frequently exercise and develop their right to
have a “second look” at arbitral awards.243  The attention to-
wards arbitration of antitrust claims has revived in recent years
243. See Donovan & Greenawalt, supra note 13, at 38 (“In the two decades R
since Mitsubishi, it appears that U.S. courts have decided only a single case in
which a party has complained about an international tribunal’s application
of a statutory claim implicating a U.S. mandatory rule.”).
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following three U.S. Supreme Court decisions addressing arbi-
tration of claims in the context of consumer contracts and
class action waivers, implicating the ability of individual con-
sumers to raise antitrust claims on behalf of a class in arbitral
proceedings.244  Yet, even though it is impossible to know for
sure how many international arbitrations raise issues of anti-
trust law, one would certainly expect more challenges related
to antitrust law than currently appear in the U.S. courts.  Inter-
estingly, for decades preceding Mitsubishi parties were willing
to fight for the arbitrability of antitrust issues and in their
quest reached the U.S. Supreme Court.  However, since Mit-
subishi, few parties have arbitrated these claims; when they
have, they appear to be willing to comply with antitrust-related
arbitral awards, without using a second chance to fight such
awards in a setting aside or enforcement proceeding.  A simi-
lar trend, although with a larger number of court decisions
from various EU jurisdictions, can be observed with respect to
arbitrations addressing EU competition law issues.
Having gained the much-desired arbitrability of antitrust
law, why do so few antitrust-related arbitral awards appear in
the courts?  One explanation may be the limited antitrust ex-
perience of arbitration practitioners who often have difficul-
ties in recognizing antitrust issues and applying antitrust
laws.245  As has been observed, the lack of understanding of
antitrust issues and the fear of complicating arbitral proceed-
ings may motivate some arbitrators and counsels to adopt “the
policy of the ostrich” even where the recognition of an anti-
244. E.g., Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662
(2010) (holding that a party may not be compelled to submit to class arbitra-
tion where the arbitration agreement is silent on the issue); AT&T Mobility
LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011) (holding that the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act (FAA) preempts a state law rules prohibiting class action waivers in
arbitration agreements); Am. Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S. Ct.
2304 (2013) (holding that the FAA does not permit courts to invalidate arbi-
tration agreements that contain class action waivers, despite the fact that the
cost of arbitration may be prohibitively high for a claimant to proceed to
arbitration on an individual basis).
245. See LANDOLT, supra note 24, ¶ 1–08 (“Arbitration practitioners fre- R
quently struggle with the EC competition law questions.  They struggle to
identify them, and if they have discerned that faint looming of a competition
issue they approach it with perceptible caution.”); id. at 3 n.1 (“The result of
competition law analysis in arbitration is thus frequently, and conveniently, a
determination that in fact no violation has occurred.”).
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trust violation would significantly change the position of the
parties (e.g., retroactively relieving one of them of contractual
obligations due to a contract being in breach of antitrust
law).246  Not surprisingly, the antitrust law analysis in the con-
text of arbitral proceedings frequently results in a determina-
tion that no antitrust violation has occurred.247
The second explanation may come from the contractual
nature of international arbitration.  Simply put, international
arbitration requires an arbitration agreement and as such nec-
essarily limits the types of antitrust claims and disputes that
can be resolved in arbitration.  And so, although antitrust
claims are objectively arbitrable, arbitration is often not a via-
ble option because the parties have not contracted to arbi-
trate, or the scope of their arbitration agreement is too narrow
to include antitrust claims.
The third explanation may be that what we observe with
respect to antitrust arbitrations—namely, the apparent lack of
court cases dealing with antitrust-related arbitral awards—is no
more than a reflection of a general trend in international arbi-
tration where most arbitral awards are believed to be complied
with voluntarily by the parties.248  If this is so, then the majority
of arbitral awards, including antitrust-related awards, are never
challenged in courts in setting aside or enforcement proceed-
ings.  And there is no reason to believe that the situation is
substantially different for antitrust arbitrations.  Thus, the low
number of court cases related to antitrust arbitrations is argua-
bly not a sign of troubles or non-existence of antitrust arbitra-
tions, but rather an indication that antitrust arbitration re-
mains a developing area of practice.
However, even the limited number of court cases we have
observed to date persuasively demonstrate that the courts are
no longer suspicious of parties seeking to arbitrate antitrust
claims behind the “closed doors” of international arbitration.
Instead, the courts and regulators increasingly invoke the assis-
246. Id. ¶ 1–13.
247. Id. at 3 n.1 (referring to Laurence Idot, Arbitration and EC Law, 5
INT’L BUS. L.J. 561, 576 (1996), where the examination of published arbitral
awards revealed that “arbitrators almost invariably find no violation of the
rule of EC competition law”).
248. S.I. Strong, Border Skirmishes: The Intersection between Litigation and Inter-
national Commercial Arbitration, J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 8 (2012).
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tance of arbitral tribunals in the enforcement of antitrust law,
even in the absence of the parties’ will to arbitrate such claims.
The attitude towards international arbitration has thus
evolved from suspicion to trust.  First, arbitration was consid-
ered to be unsuitable for the resolution of antitrust claims.
Next, following the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Mitsubishi,
it was allowed to address antitrust claims, but the courts were
explicitly granted the right to review the resultant awards (al-
though the precise standards of such review were never articu-
lated by the courts and are still being developed).  Today, the
focus appears to be shifting from merely resolving antitrust dis-
putes in arbitration to finding ways to motivate arbitral tribu-
nals to enforce antitrust law even where the parties have not
raised antitrust issues.
As a result, what we witness today is the increasingly
changing role of arbitral tribunals in antitrust arbitrations—
from that of a neutral adjudicator of private disputes to the
performer of hybrid functions of adjudication and enforce-
ment of domestic antitrust laws.  We can further improve the
current regime of antitrust arbitrations by invoking even
greater assistance of arbitrators in the application of antitrust
law in lieu of allowing courts to interfere in the arbitral pro-
cess through extensive review of arbitral awards for compli-
ance with antitrust law.  As the published awards and court
cases illustrate, arbitrators are well capable of doing so in the
most complex antitrust disputes.  They also should feel
obliged to raise and apply antitrust law even sua sponte, moti-
vated by a desire to produce an enforceable award backed up
by reputational concerns.  Arbitrators are repeat players in in-
ternational arbitration and as such they benefit from produc-
ing enforceable awards immune from potential challenges due
to their antitrust law implications.  Overall, this would allow
the parties to exercise their right of private dispute resolution,
but also give the state further assurances that antitrust claims
and issues are duly addressed by arbitral tribunals in interna-
tional arbitrations.
V. CONCLUSION
It may be too late to set international arbitration com-
pletely free of mandatory laws, to establish a truly autonomous
private order for transnational dispute resolution.  As the late
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Hans Smit eloquently put it, “it may well be that too much
water has flown over the dam to reverse the Supreme Court’s
contrary rulings.”249  But despite the nominal yoke of
mandatory antitrust laws, international arbitration has won the
battle on the ground.  It has repeatedly proved capable of set-
tling private disputes involving public policy concerns, such as
international arbitration of domestic antitrust claims.  Along
the way it has gained trust not only from private parties choos-
ing arbitration for the resolution of their international dis-
putes, but also from national courts and public antitrust au-
thorities.
With trust comes duty.  In the case of antitrust arbitration,
it is the obligation of international arbitrators to raise and
properly apply any antitrust issues in a proceeding before
them and to ensure the recognition and enforcement of the
resultant arbitral award.
What is the best way to ensure that international arbitral
tribunals fulfill this duty?  As national courts have realized, in-
trusive judicial review of awards under the public policy rubric
is not the answer.  What is needed, instead, are incentives for
international arbitrators to address antitrust laws on their own,
which in turn requires arbitrators informed and up to date on
the relevant law and the presumption of their public function
as agents of public antitrust authorities.
As the arbitral awards and court cases described above
demonstrate, over a period of only thirty years international
arbitration has gained the strong trust of courts and antitrust
authorities as a forum for the enforcement of antitrust laws.
This evolution appears to confirm international arbitration’s
ability to successfully address regulatory disputes on par with
domestic courts, at least in the realm of antitrust.  If in that
realm, there may yet be hope in other realms.
A particularly tendentious criticism of the TTIP and the
TPP regimes are their investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS)
mechanisms.  The gist of the critique is that the investor-state
arbitral tribunals will be pro-corporation and inadequate sub-
stitutes for national public courts and adjudicators.250  The ar-
249. Smit, supra note 230, at 170. R
250. See European Commission Concept Paper, Investment in TTIP and
Beyond – The Path for Reform Enhancing the Right to Regulate and Mov-
ing from Current Ad Hoc Arbitration Towards an Investment Court (May 5,
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guments and fears we hear today with respect to ISDS are sub-
stantially similar to those expressed in the American Safety251
doctrine with respect to the role of international arbitral tribu-
nals in enforcing antitrust laws.  Given the remarkable trans-
formation from suspicion to trust of arbitral tribunals in the
antitrust arena, there is at least reason to hope that arbitration
in the context of the far-reaching TTIP and TPP will not be as
inconsistent with the public interest as the naysayers have pre-
dicted.
2015), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/may/tradoc_1534
08.pdf (expressing the Commission’s concerns over the lack of transparency
and legitimacy in the current system of investor-state dispute settlement
(ISDS), including the ability of foreign investors—through investor-state ar-
bitration—to interfere with the government’s right to regulate for the public
benefit and therefore proposing to replace the current ISDS regime with a
permanent international investment court system).
251. See Am. Safety Equip. Corp. v. J. P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821,
827–28 (2d Cir. 1968) (“We conclude only that the pervasive public interest
in enforcement of the antitrust laws, and the nature of the claims that arise
in such cases, combine to make the outcome here clear. In some situations
Congress has allowed parties to obtain the advantages of arbitration if they
‘are willing to accept less certainty of legally correct adjustment,’ but we do
not think that this is one of them. In short, we conclude that the antitrust
claims raised here are inappropriate for arbitration.” (quoting Wilko v. Swan,
346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953)).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYI\48-3\NYI303.txt unknown Seq: 66  4-MAY-16 8:38
